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ARTICLES 
RESTRICTING TESTAMENTARY FREEDOM:  
EX ANTE VERSUS EX POST JUSTIFICATIONS 
Daniel B. Kelly* 
 
The organizing principle of American succession law—testamentary 
freedom—gives decedents a nearly unrestricted right to dispose of property.  
After surveying the justifications for testamentary freedom, I examine the 
circumstances in which it may be socially beneficial for courts to alter 
wills, trusts, and other gratuitous transfers at death:  imperfect information, 
negative externalities, and intergenerational equity.  These justifications 
correspond with many existing limitations on the freedom of testation.  Yet, 
disregarding donor intent to maximize the donees’ ex post interests, an 
increasingly common justification for intervention, is socially undesirable.  
Doing so ignores important ex ante considerations, including a donor’s 
happiness, a donor’s incentive to work, save, and invest, and the structure 
and timing of a donor’s gifts.  If donors believe courts may not facilitate 
their intent, donors may be less happy, accumulate less property, and alter 
gifts during life.  Moreover, because the law often affects donor behavior, 
ignoring donative intent to benefit particular donees may harm not only the 
donors but also donees as a class.  Thus, the living may themselves benefit 
if the law allows a certain degree of “dead hand” control. 
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 “The brutal fact remains:  the dead are definitively dead.  The dead 
‘control’ beyond the grave only insofar as living people let them do so.  In 
the long run, the dead run nothing.”1 
“How, possibly, can the ‘use’ of a dead person, albeit through the use of 
another, have normative force?  Though we appear to respect the 
intentions of the dead, we may be fools to do so.”2 
INTRODUCTION 
The law generally defers to owners in deciding how to use their property.  
One justification for this deference is that owners typically internalize the 
benefits and costs of their actions.  Therefore, an owner’s private incentive 
to use property often will coincide with its socially optimal use.  Similarly, 
the law usually defers to donors in deciding the nature, timing, and 
recipients of gifts, including gifts at death.  For example, in interpreting a 
will or trust,3 the “controlling consideration” is the donor’s intention.4  One 
justification for privileging donative intent, like the justification for 
deferring to owners in how they use their property, is that doing so will 
promote social welfare.5 
Testamentary freedom has several advantages.  Transferring property at 
death functions as another use of property; consequently, effectuating a 
donor’s intent should maximize the donor’s happiness.  Testamentary 
freedom also aligns an individual’s incentive to work, save, and invest with 
what is socially optimal, promoting capital accumulation and long-term 
productivity.  In addition, a donor may have more information than either a 
legislature or court about the optimal distribution of property to family 
members or other donees.  Finally, testamentary freedom may have benefits 
for familial relationships by increasing parental control over children or 
 
 1. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, DEAD HANDS:  A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WILLS, TRUSTS, AND 
INHERITANCE LAW 182 (2009). 
 2. J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 99 (1997). 
 3. A donor may transfer property via a will (testator) or trust (settlor), and a donee may 
receive property by means of a will (devisee) or trust (beneficiary).  While the trust is a 
common technique for avoiding probate and allocating property, the analysis in this Article 
could apply to a range of nonprobate transfers including not only revocable trusts but also 
life insurance policies and brokerage or retirement accounts with beneficiary designations. 
 4. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:  WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS  § 10.1 
cmt. c (2003) (“[L]aw does not grant courts any general authority to question the wisdom, 
fairness, or reasonableness of the donor’s decisions about how to allocate his or her 
property.”). 
 5. On social welfare and the assumptions of welfare economics, see infra note 51.  On 
why a property owner’s private incentive to use property may converge with the socially 
optimal result, see Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. 
REV. 347 (1967).  An owner’s private incentive may diverge from the socially optimal result 
if the owner’s use entails a negative (or positive) effect on others.  In the context of donating 
property (rather than using it), there is also a concern about both external costs, see infra Part 
III.A.2 (discussing justifications for restricting testamentary freedom based on the existence 
of “negative externalities”), and external benefits. See Louis Kaplow, Tax Policy and Gifts, 
88 AM. ECON. REV. 283, 284 (1998) (“Gifts convey a sort of positive externality on donees” 
(citing Louis Kaplow, A Note on Subsidizing Gifts, 58 J. PUB. ECON. 469 (1995) [hereinafter 
Kaplow, A Note on Subsidizing Gifts], and A.B. Atkinson, Capital Taxes, the Redistribution 
of Wealth and Individual Savings, 38 REV. ECON. STUD. 209 (1971))). 
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encouraging children to care for parents.  Given these benefits, as well as 
the costs of attempting to prohibit donative transfers, a system of succession 
based on the freedom of disposition is arguably the “least objectionable 
arrangement for dealing with property on the owner’s death.”6 
Yet the law does not privilege donative intent in all circumstances.  
Courts may alter a gift by refusing to enforce the provisions of a will, 
modifying or terminating a trust, or interpreting the terms of a will or trust.  
Is such intervention warranted?  If so, under what circumstances should the 
courts intervene?  Using insights from the economic analysis of law, this 
Article examines the justifications for restricting testamentary freedom and 
the circumstances in which it may be socially desirable or undesirable for 
the law to alter wills, trusts, and other gratuitous transfers at death. 
My thesis has two parts:  (1) there are several legitimate justifications for 
legal intervention in donative transfers at death, including (in theory) 
imperfect information, negative externalities, and intergenerational equity; 
however, (2) intervening to maximize the donees’ ex post interests is not a 
legitimate justification for disregarding a donor’s wishes.  Clarifying the 
justifications for legal intervention in donative transfers at death has payoffs 
for legislatures, courts, and law reformers.7 
Consider three justifications for restricting testamentary freedom.  First, 
due to imperfect information, including unforeseen as well as unprovided-
for contingencies, altering a will or trust may be desirable.  Suppose a donor 
(D) leaves money for the cure of polio.  Twenty years later, scientists 
discover a cure.8  Reallocating D’s gift (e.g., to find the cure for another 
disease) is likely to be socially beneficial, and consistent with D’s probable 
intent, even if D did not provide for this contingency in her will or trust. 
Second, if a gift entails negative externalities, intervening may be 
desirable if the private incentive to give diverges from the socially optimal 
result.  Suppose D has $10 million but D’s spouse (S) and minor child (C) 
have $0.  Assume S and C will receive public support if D disinherits them.  
Knowing this, D may reduce or eliminate a gift to S and C.  As a result, the 
law may require that D provide some minimal level of support.9 
 
 6. Edward C. Halbach, Jr., An Introduction to Chapters 1–4, in DEATH, TAXES AND 
FAMILY PROPERTY 3, 5 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977). 
 7. Legal intervention can be either legislative (e.g., a state legislature’s enactment of an 
elective share) or judicial (a state court’s modification of a trust).  Probate and state courts 
often base their decisions on statutory law, as well as the Restatements and Uniform Codes, 
so the rules of succession can and will affect the circumstances in which a court intervenes.  
Thus, while I will speak often of “courts” and “judicial” intervention, my analysis is relevant 
not only, or even primarily, to judges, but also to legislatures and law reformers. 
 8. Between 1950 and 1963, Hilary Koprowski, Jonas Salk, and Albert Sabin 
independently developed polio vaccines. See DAVID M. OSHINSKY, POLIO:  AN AMERICAN 
STORY 268 (2005). 
 9. In the United States, all separate property states, except Georgia, provide a spousal 
elective share. See Verner F. Chaffin, A Reappraisal of the Wealth Transmission Process:  
The Surviving Spouse, Year’s Support and Intestate Succession, 10 GA. L. REV. 447, 458 
(1976).  Yet, no state, except Louisiana, has a forced share for minor children. See Ralph C. 
Brashier, Protecting the Child from Disinheritance:  Must Louisiana Stand Alone?, 57 LA. L. 
REV. 1, 23 (1996). 
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Third, legal intervention may be necessary due to considerations of 
intergenerational equity.  Given its priority in time, the present generation 
may have an incentive, as well as the ability, to control property in ways 
that favor its own interests to the detriment of future generations.  
Assuming the measure of social welfare gives significant weight to the 
well-being of future generations, the private incentive of a donor living 
today may again diverge from the socially optimal result.10 
After exploring these justifications for restricting testamentary freedom, 
this Article argues that another justification—disregarding donative intent 
to maximize the donees’ ex post interests—is socially undesirable.11  This 
justification is increasingly common in the law of succession.12  However, 
allowing a court to maximize a donee’s welfare ex post is problematic for it 
fails to incorporate ex ante considerations.  These considerations include, 
among other things, a donor’s happiness during life, the donor’s incentive 
to work, save, and invest, and the structure and timing of a donor’s gifts. 
Failing to incorporate ex ante considerations into the legal analysis is 
problematic because ex ante considerations can affect the interests of the 
donors as well as donees.  For example, if courts disregard donative intent 
at death, donors may be less happy during life, and this decrease in donor 
happiness may outweigh any increase in donee happiness.13  In addition, 
disregarding donative intent may harm the donees themselves.  In response 
to the possibility of legal intervention, a donor may alter her behavior.  For 
example, if D believes courts will not facilitate her intent, D may consume 
more during life.  If D owns less property at death, the donees will inherit 
less wealth.  Moreover, if D anticipates that a court will intervene and 
ignore her intent, D may alter her disposition by making a gift during life, 
choosing different donees, or forgoing the gift entirely.14  As a result, even 
 
 10. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 71 (2004). 
 11. Focusing exclusively on the donees’ welfare ex post is problematic, notwithstanding 
a trustee’s duty to manage a trust on behalf of beneficiaries. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TRUSTS § 78(1) (2007) (“[A] trustee has a duty to administer the trust solely in the interest of 
the beneficiaries, or solely in furtherance of its charitable purpose.”); cf. John H. Langbein, 
Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty:  Sole Interest or Best Interest?, 114 YALE L.J. 
929, 980–82 (2005) (discussing a trustee’s obligation to act in the “best interests” of the 
beneficiaries). 
 12. See Thomas P. Gallanis, The New Direction of American Trust Law, 97 IOWA L. 
REV. 215, 216 (2011) (“American trust law, after decades of favoring the settlor, is moving 
in a new direction, with a reassertion of the interests and rights of the beneficiaries.”); cf. 
Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235, 236 (1996) 
(“A careful review of case law . . . reveals that many courts do not exalt testamentary 
freedom above all other principles.”). 
 13. Although fairly straightforward, this insight illustrates the flaws in a common 
argument for interfering with a bequest:  “The donor is dead.  Ignore the dead guy’s wishes, 
and let’s do whatever is best for the living.” See Joel C. Dobris, Undoing Repeal of the Rule 
Against Perpetuities:  Federal and State Tools for Breaking Dynasty Trusts, 27 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 2537, 2548–49 (2006) (“I can’t believe that reverence for some dead guy’s intent is 
going to determine major outcomes.”).  Such an argument could be sound only if one 
assumes that a particular donor, while alive, believes the law will facilitate her wishes, even 
though courts are often unwilling to facilitate the wishes of others. 
 14. See SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 66 (“[L]egal policies controlling inheritance can be 
partially circumvented by increases in inter vivos gifts.  For example, were a law to require 
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if individual donees have an incentive to attempt to modify a donor’s gift in 
particular cases, donees may be worse off as a class if courts restrict 
testamentary freedom while ignoring important ex ante considerations.15 
In some respects, the justifications for intervening to alter wills and trusts 
are analogous to the justifications for modifying or interpreting contracts.  
Contract scholars have analyzed similar issues that arise because parties are 
unable to anticipate future contingencies or may not wish to incur the costs 
of specifying additional contingencies even if they are foreseeable.16  Thus, 
insights from contract law may be useful in analyzing succession law.17  
Yet, succession law involves an issue that is usually absent in contract law:  
dead hand control.18  Indeed, unlike in contract law, “renegotiation” with 
the donor is no longer feasible in wills, trusts, and estates.19 
 
that half of a person’s property pass to the person’s spouse and children, the person could 
transfer much of his wealth to an alternative preferred donee during his life.”).  The concern 
is that restricting testamentary freedom without incorporating ex ante considerations may 
reduce the “size of the pie” by distorting various incentives of donors and donees, including 
decisions about saving versus consuming, working versus not working, giving later versus 
giving now, and the like.  The question of the extent to which various doctrines in succession 
law distort these incentives is an empirical question that is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 15. To alter a bequest or modify a trust for their own benefit, individual donees may 
have an incentive to litigate.  But if a court disregards donative intent, litigation may harm 
donees as a class because the incentive of particular donees is not necessarily aligned with 
the overall interests of donees. See Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 
89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 659 (2004) (making this point in the context of trust modification 
and termination).  It is also worth noting that the class of donors or donees is not static, as 
the donees in one generation are likely to become the donors for the next generation. 
 16. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, On the Writing and Interpretation of Contracts, 22 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 289 (2006); see also Benjamin E. Hermalin et al., Contract Law, in 
1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 3, 68–99 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell 
eds., 2007) (discussing incomplete contracts). 
 17. On trusts as contracts, see John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of 
Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625 (1995). See also Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions 
of Trust Law:  A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434, 447–50 
(1998); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 
COLUM. L. REV. 773, 844–45 (2001). 
 18. In its modern usage, dead hand control refers to the idea that a person who has died 
may continue to assert control over his or her property even after death. See FRIEDMAN, 
supra note 1, at 4 (discussing postmortem control by the dead).  Postmortem control is 
possible both at the time of death (via a will) and for many years after death (via a trust). See 
ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 467 (R.L. Meek et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 
1978) (1766) (“To give a man power over his property after his death is very considerable, 
but it is nothing [compared] to an extension of this power to the end of the world.”); John H. 
Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (2004) 
(“The distinctive attribute of a trust is that it can and commonly does perpetuate the settlor’s 
autonomy after his or her death (hence the dead-hand label).”).  Originally, the term “dead 
hand” most likely referred to a donee, not the donor, especially a donee who was not able to 
perform certain feudal obligations. See SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 67 n.67 (“[T]he term 
‘dead hand’ originally referred to the donee, notably, to a religious corporation that had been 
granted land.” (citing LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 2–3 (1955))). 
 19. Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 699 (8th ed. 2010) (noting the 
impossibility of “recontracting” in wills, trusts, and estates). 
2013] RESTRICTING TESTAMENTARY FREEDOM 1131 
This issue—the extent to which the law should facilitate the wishes of the 
dead over the lives of the living—is a perennial one.20  And debates about 
the scope of dead hand control are not merely of philosophical or historical 
interest.21  Estimates suggest that, in the United States alone, at least $41 
trillion will pass between generations from 1998 to 2052.22  The magnitude 
of this potential wealth transfer is due, in part, to the “baby boomers,” the 
generation of Americans born between 1946 and 1964.23  However, there is 
no evidence to suggest that these “baby boomers” will be less inclined to 
assert postmortem control over their property, and some evidence to suggest 
that incentive trusts, which allow a settlor to delineate the terms and 
conditions of a gift, continue to be a common estate planning technique.24  
Moreover, because several states have recently abolished the rule against 
perpetuities (RAP), thereby clearing the way for “perpetual” or “dynasty” 
trusts,25 there is renewed interest in the dead hand among legislatures and 
courts as well as legal scholars and law reformers.26 
 
 20. Thomas Jefferson, in writing to James Madison, argued that the question of “whether 
one generation of men has a right to bind another,” including intergenerational transfers of 
land, is a “question of such consequences as not only to merit decision, but place also among 
the fundamental principles of every government.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James 
Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 3 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 103 (H.A. Washington 
ed., N.Y., John C. Riker 1854); see also Jed Rubenfeld, The Moment and the Millennium, 66 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1085, 1087 (1998) (discussing Jefferson’s letter to Madison and noting 
Jefferson “argues against all inherited obligations, including those of inherited laws”). 
 21. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 4, 179 (noting that, while “it has suffered greatly 
from scholarly neglect,” succession law and questions “about the rights and powers, the 
scope and limits, of the dead hand” are of “immense importance socially, culturally, and 
economically”). 
 22. See John J. Havens & Paul G. Schervish, Why the $41 Trillion Wealth Transfer 
Estimate Is Still Valid:  A Review of Challenges and Comments, 7 GIFT PLAN. 1 (2003). 
 23. See GRAYSON K. VINCENT & VICTORIA A. VELKOFF, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE 
NEXT FOUR DECADES:  THE OLDER POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES:  2010 TO 2050 
(2010), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/p25-1138.pdf. 
 24. Although the empirical data is limited, one estate planning survey suggests that 57 
percent of Americans with $10 million or more in assets and 42 percent of Americans with 
$5 to $9.9 million in assets utilize an incentive trust. PNC FIN. SERVS. GRP., INC., PNC 
WEALTH MANAGEMENT WEALTH AND VALUES SURVEY:  INHERITANCE HIGHLIGHTS 2007, at 2 
(2007), available at https://www.pnc.com/webapp/unsec/Requester?resource=/wps/wcm/
connect/aba13c004e5c6f3e8f078ffc6d630ad7/PNC_WV_Inheritance_Highlights.pdf?MOD=
AJPERES&CACHEID=aba13c004e5c6f3e8f078ffc6d630ad7. 
 25. See generally Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 
50 UCLA L. REV. 1303 (2003) (discussing perpetual trusts).  On the rise of perpetual trusts 
and abolition of the RAP, see generally Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, 
Perpetuities or Taxes?  Explaining the Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2465 (2006), and Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for 
Trust Funds:  An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356 (2005). 
 26. In response to such developments, many legal scholars have not only denounced 
dynasty trusts, but have also hypothesized that American law is ceding too much power to 
the deceased. See, e.g., RONALD CHESTER, FROM HERE TO ETERNITY?  PROPERTY AND THE 
DEAD HAND 116 (2007) (“[D]ynasty trusts have negative effects both for their living 
beneficiaries and for American society.”); RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW:  
THE RISING POWER OF THE AMERICAN DEAD 82 (2010) (“[D]ynasty trusts have the capacity 
to impose considerable societal harm.”); Mark L. Ascher, But I Thought the Earth Belonged 
to the Living, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1149, 1160–61 (2011) (stating that permitting “private trusts 
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Thus, this Article analyzes the justifications for restricting testamentary 
freedom.  There are few attempts to analyze the issue systematically,27 
especially from a functional perspective.28  This lack of functional analysis 
is surprising, given the potential benefits of applying economic insights to 
succession law.29  Moreover, from recent books like Immortality and the 
Law:  The Rising Power of the American Dead to articles such as But I 
Thought the Earth Belonged to the Living, a number of scholars have 
argued (with some force) that the legal system cedes too much control to 
the dead.30  This Article contends that nearly the opposite may be true:  
while perpetual trusts and other forms of dead hand control can be 
problematic,31 there is also a risk of disregarding donative intent and 
restricting testamentary freedom in ways that are socially detrimental and 
that harm donors as well as their potential donees. 
Part I provides an overview of American succession law, including the 
principle of testamentary freedom, its economic justifications, and its legal 
limitations.  Part II explains why the ex ante perspective is relevant for 
analyzing succession law and highlights a number of ex ante considerations 
that are often overlooked.  Part III investigates justifications for restricting 
testamentary freedom:  imperfect information, negative externalities, and 
 
to be perpetual is loony” and noting that “the only real beneficiaries will be the trustees and 
the lawyers”). 
 27. For a summary of some of the primary arguments for restricting the dead hand, see 
Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth Century, 37 
STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1257–64 (1985).  For an earlier treatment, see SIMES, supra note 18. 
 28. For a concise analysis of economic arguments for and against dead hand control, see 
SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 68–72. See also Halbach, supra note 6, at 5–8 (outlining 
economic justifications for inheritance); Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A 
Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1, 5–18 (1992) (discussing rationales for 
testamentary freedom as well as objections and qualifications).  There is a vast literature on 
estate taxation, but my primary focus is on other limitations on testamentary freedom, and I 
discuss the issue of taxation only briefly. See infra notes 178–79, 184, 187, 254, 295–97 and 
accompanying text. 
 29. See Daniel B. Kelly, Toward Economic Analysis of the Uniform Probate Code, 45 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 855 (2012); cf. Adam J. Hirsch, Freedom of Testation/Freedom of 
Contract, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2180, 2253 (2011) (“[T]he field of wills remains 
underdeveloped theoretically [because s]cholars have rarely tilled its soil with the 
implements of interdisciplinary analysis . . . .”).  For an example incorporating the idea of 
agency costs into trust law, see Sitkoff, supra note 15.  Sitkoff, as well as Max 
Schanzenbach and Jonathan Klick, have led the way in the economic analysis of trusts, 
including a number of important empirical studies. See, e.g., Jonathan Klick & Robert H. 
Sitkoff, Agency Costs, Charitable Trusts, and Corporate Control:  Evidence from Hershey’s 
Kiss-Off, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 749 (2008); Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Did 
Reform of Prudent Trust Investment Laws Change Trust Portfolio Allocation?, 50 J.L. & 
ECON. 681 (2007). 
 30. See, e.g., MADOFF, supra note 26, at 154 (discussing the “rising power of the 
American dead” and arguing that “deference to the wishes of the dead imposes significant 
costs on living individuals and threatens our most fundamental societal values”); Ascher, 
supra note 26, at 1149 (maintaining that “certain trends in the law of the dead have 
threatened to put us sharply at odds with Jefferson’s vision” that “‘the earth belongs . . . to 
the living’”). 
 31. For an argument for limiting the dead hand in the context of perpetual trusts and the 
RAP, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:  WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS ch. 27 
introductory note (2011). 
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intergenerational equity.  I contend that, while these justifications can be 
consistent with increasing social welfare, disregarding donative intent to 
maximize the donees’ ex post interests is undesirable.  Part IV analyzes 
legal restrictions on testamentary freedom and evaluates the extent to which 
these restrictions are consistent with the economic justifications. 
I.  STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN SUCCESSION LAW 
Understanding American succession law requires an understanding of its 
organizing principle, testamentary freedom.  The freedom of disposition is 
central in the law of wills as well as trusts.  After discussing the role of 
testamentary freedom in succession law (Part I.A), I outline several of the 
primary economic justifications for testamentary freedom (Part I.B) and 
examine the current legal restrictions on testamentary freedom (Part I.C). 
A.  The Organizing Principle:  Testamentary Freedom 
It may well be that “the institution of inheritance is universal,”32 but, 
historically, legal systems diverge on the institutional mechanisms for 
facilitating the intergenerational transfer of private property.  Unlike laws 
that rely on primogeniture,33 require equal division,34 or attempt to abolish 
inheritance,35 the “organizing principle” of American succession law is the 
“freedom of disposition” or testamentary freedom.36  Testamentary freedom 
is “the idea that a person has the right to choose who will succeed to things 
of value left behind at death.”37  Freedom of testation is “a characteristically 
 
 32. Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1369 n.270 (1993) 
(citing PIERRE L. VAN DEN BERGHE, HUMAN FAMILY SYSTEMS 89 (1979)); see also Halbach, 
supra note 6, at 4 (“[S]ome form of inheritance is virtually a universal institution of ancient 
and modern societies.”). 
 33. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 382–83  (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner eds., Clarendon Press 1976) (1776) 
(explaining primogeniture’s origins in medieval Europe). 
 34. See JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 1038 (Batoche Books 
2001) (1848) (opining that equal division laws are “very seriously objectionable”). 
 35. See Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, in KARL MARX:  
SELECTED WRITINGS 221, 237 (David McLellan ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1977) (1848) 
(advocating “[a]bolition of all right of inheritance”); see also Frances Foster-Simons, The 
Development of Inheritance Law in the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, 33 
AM. J. COMP. L. 33, 36–37 (1985) (discussing how the U.S.S.R. “began the process of 
institutionalizing inheritance” in 1922, only four years after “the Soviet regime officially 
abolished the right”). 
 36. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:  WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 
cmt. a (2003); see also Robert H. Sitkoff, Trusts and Estates:  Implementing Freedom of 
Disposition, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. (forthcoming 2014) (“The organizing principle of the 
American law of succession, both probate and nonprobate, is freedom of disposition.”). 
 37. Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law of Succession in Social Perspective, in DEATH, 
TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY, supra note 6, at 9, 12.  Testamentary freedom, i.e., a donor’s 
right to select beneficiaries is technically distinct from the freedom of inheritance, i.e., a 
donee’s right to receive property or donor’s right to avoid confiscation. See Hirsch & Wang, 
supra note 28, at 6 n.16; see also ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 168 
(1974) (distinguishing between the “right to inherit” and the “right to bequeath”). 
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modern idea—it was and is rare in simpler societies; but it is a leading 
principle in the United States and most western countries.”38 
While different countries have embraced different conceptions of 
testamentary freedom,39 succession law in the United States gives donors a 
“nearly unrestricted right to dispose of their property as they please.”40  
American succession law privileges “donor’s intention” as the “controlling 
consideration” in determining the meaning of a donative document.41  As 
the Restatement (Third) of Property:  Wills and Other Donative Transfers 
emphasizes, the “law does not grant courts any general authority to question 
the wisdom, fairness, or reasonableness of the donor’s decisions about how 
to allocate his or her property.”42  The function of succession law is to 
“facilitate rather than regulate.”43  Similarly, the Uniform Probate Code 
(UPC) provides that one of the Code’s “underlying purposes and policies” 
is “to discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in distribution of 
his property.”44 
The idea of testamentary freedom is central not only in wills but also in 
trusts.  Many courts emphasize that, just as the court’s role in interpreting a 
will is to facilitate a testator’s intent, the role of the court in construing a 
trust is to effectuate the settlor’s intent.45  Historically, donative intent has 
been a “defining force in trust law—the ‘polestar’ which guided all aspects 
of trust administration.”46  Thus, for both wills and trusts, the freedom of 
testation—“the dead hand’s right to decide how property will be handled 
after a person dies”—is the “basic principle” of succession law.47 
 
 38. Friedman, supra note 37, at 12. 
 39. See, e.g., JENS BECKERT, INHERITED WEALTH 21–82 (Thomas Dunlap trans., 2008) 
(comparing testamentary freedom in France, Germany, and the United States); Joshua C. 
Tate, Caregiving and the Case for Testamentary Freedom, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 129, 137–
42 (2008) (discussing how the American approach to disinheritance of children “contrasts 
sharply with those of civil law and Commonwealth jurisdictions”). 
 40. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:  WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 
cmt. a. 
 41. Id. § 10.1 (“[A] donor’s intention is given effect to the maximum extent allowed by 
law.”). 
 42. Id. § 10.1 cmt. c. 
 43. Id. 
 44. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 1-102(b)(2), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 26 (2010); see also id. art. II 
prefatory note, 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 75 (noting a “decline of formalism in favor of intent-serving 
policies”); John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reforming the Law of Gratuitous 
Transfers:  The New Uniform Probate Code, 55 ALB. L. REV. 871, 874–75 (1992). 
 45. See, e.g., In re Estate of Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d 888, 896 (Ill. 2009) (emphasizing a 
“public policy favoring testamentary freedom”); Thorson v. Neb. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 740 N.W.2d 27, 33 (Neb. 2007) (concluding that the “primary rule” is that “a court 
must, if possible, ascertain the intention of the testator or creator”); In re Lowy, 931 A.2d 
552, 556 (N.H. 2007) (pointing out that the settlor’s intention is “paramount”). 
 46. Jeffrey A. Cooper, Empty Promises:  Settlor’s Intent, the Uniform Trust Code, and 
the Future of Trust Investment Law, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1165, 1171 (2008) (citing In re 
Sherman Trust, 179 N.W. 109, 112 (Iowa 1920) (citing Wilberding v. Miller, 106 N.E. 665, 
667 (Ohio 1913))); see also Bryan v. Dethlefs, 959 So. 2d 314, 317 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2007) (“The polestar of trust or will interpretation is the settlor’s intent.”). 
 47. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 19; see also Paula A. Monopoli, Toward Equality:  
Nonmarital Children and the Uniform Probate Code, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 995, 1010 
n.94 (2012) (“Freedom of testation and testator’s intent are frequently identified as 
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B.  Economic Justifications for Testamentary Freedom 
Most scholars today emphasize a view of testamentary freedom that is 
rooted in positive law and justified by functional considerations.48  This 
functional perspective emphasizes the “social welfare” of the parties and 
seeks to determine how the law can create the best incentives for the donor, 
donees, and other parties that a donor’s disposition of property may affect.49  
Under this economic or functional approach, there are several justifications 
for privileging testamentary freedom.50 
First, the freedom of testation maximizes donor satisfaction.  As Edward 
Halbach puts it, 
[A] society should be concerned with the total amount of happiness it can 
offer, and to many of its members it is a great comfort and satisfaction to 
know during life that, even after death, those whom one cares about can 
be provided for and may be able to enjoy better lives because of the 
inheritance that can be left to them.51 
 
paramount jurisprudential touchstones in the area of trusts and estates.”); Sitkoff, supra note 
36; cf. Klick & Sitkoff, supra note 29, at 824 (noting that, even in charitable trusts, the 
“presumption should be in favor of the donor’s intent”). 
 48. See Pamela R. Champine, My Will Be Done:  Accommodating the Erring and the 
Atypical Testator, 80 NEB. L. REV. 387, 432 (2001) (characterizing “[the] view which posits 
that testamentary freedom . . . is a privilege offered for the purpose of motivating socially 
desirable behavior” as the “most prevalent justification for testamentary freedom”).  Early 
natural law writers like Hugo Grotius and John Locke argued a testator had the right to 
bequeath property to whomever he wished, subject to certain obligations to dependents. See 
2 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES [ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE:  
THREE BOOKS] 265 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., Clarendon Press 1925) (1625); JOHN LOCKE, 
SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 65, at 36 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett Pub. Co. 
1980) (1690) (“[A] father may dispose of his own possessions as he pleases, when his 
children are out of danger of perishing for want . . . .”).  But several natural law scholars, 
including William Blackstone and Samuel Pufendorf, criticized using the natural law as the 
basis for testamentary freedom. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *10–11; 2 
SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OCTO [ON THE LAW OF NATURE 
AND OF NATIONS:  EIGHT BOOKS] 615–20 (C.H. Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather trans., 
Clarendon Press 1934) (1688); see also BECKERT, supra note 39, at 51 (discussing 
Pufendorf); Hirsch & Wang, supra note 28, at 7 (discussing Blackstone). 
 49. Halbach, supra note 6, at 5–6; Adam J. Hirsch, Bequests for Purposes:  A Unified 
Theory, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 33, 51 (1999); Hirsch & Wang, supra note 28, at 6–14.  In 
this Article, I adopt most of the assumptions of welfare economics, including the idea that 
donors and donees are rational and forward looking and that interpersonal utility 
comparisons are feasible.  See SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 595–98.  Welfare economics does 
not exclude other considerations, such as the autonomy of the donor or fairness to the 
donees, as long as these considerations are not given independent weight.  For simplicity, I 
bracket several questions in social choice theory about aggregating individual preferences 
into a social welfare function.  For early contributions to this literature, see generally 
KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963); WILLIAM H. 
RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM:  A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THEORY OF 
DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE (1982). 
 50. See Halbach, supra note 6, at 5 (discussing rationales for testamentary freedom); 
Hirsch & Wang, supra note 28, at 6–14 (same). 
 51. Halbach, supra note 6, at 5; see also Hirsch & Wang, supra note 28, at 8 (“Bracton’s 
assumption—shared by modern social scientists—was that persons derive satisfaction out of 
bequeathing property to others.”). 
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  Steven Shavell points out that “bequeathing property is simply one way 
of using property.”52  Consequently, interfering with bequests “tends to 
reduce individuals’ utility” because “a person will derive less utility from 
property if he wants to bequeath it but is prevented from doing so.”53  To 
the extent that a donor’s private interests may converge with what is 
socially optimal, the donor will have an incentive to promote social welfare. 
Second, testamentary freedom promotes capital accumulation.  Shavell 
notes that “a person will not work as hard to accumulate property if he 
cannot then bequeath it as he pleases.”54  Likewise, other commentators 
suggest that the freedom of testation may be an “incentive to industry and 
saving,”55 “encouragement to industry and thrift,”56 and “incentive for 
productive activities.”57  Thus, if a donor may dispose of property at death, 
the donor’s incentive to work, save, and invest converges with the optimal 
result.  By contrast, if a donor prefers to give property to another but instead 
decides to consume the property, a reduction in savings will affect not only 
the donor’s utility but also society’s savings and its capital base.  For this 
reason, Gordon Tullock contends that the “principal” argument for 
inheritance is “conservation of capital.”58 
Third, compared to legislatures or courts, donors may possess better 
information about the circumstances of family members and other donees.59  
This informational advantage may allow donors to select the highest-valued 
donee (e.g., a gifted or disabled child).60  By contrast, legislatures must rely 
on general rules governing the succession of property (e.g., the first child 
inherits everything or each child receives an equal share), which can be 
overinclusive, underinclusive, or both.  Typically, courts have neither the 
 
 52. SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 65. 
 53. Id.; see also Gordon Tullock, Inheritance Justified, 14 J.L. & ECON. 465, 474 (1971) 
(“Individuals before their death would be injured if they are prohibited from passing on their 
estate to their heirs because it eliminates one possible alternative which they might otherwise 
choose.”). 
 54. SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 65. 
 55. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 28, at 8. 
 56. Halbach, supra note 6, at 4. 
 57. Jeffrey E. Stake, Darwin, Donations, and the Illusion of Dead Hand Control, 64 
TUL. L. REV. 705, 749 (1990); see also Robert C. Ellickson, Adverse Possession and 
Perpetuities Law:  Two Dents in the Libertarian Model of Property Rights, 64 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 723, 735–63 (1986). 
 58. Tullock, supra note 53, at 465. 
 59. See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 28, at 12 (arguing that testamentary freedom 
“‘permits more intelligent estate planning,’ by allowing the testator to ‘take account of the 
differing needs’ of members of her family” (quoting WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN, JR. ET AL., 
WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES § 3.8, at 88–89 (1988))). But cf. Stake, supra note 57, at 730 
(arguing that “donations are not necessarily tailored to achieve an optimal distribution of 
rights” because “the donor’s intended distribution will maximize the benefit to the donor’s 
genes”). 
 60. See C.Y. Cyrus Chu, Primogeniture, 99 J. POLIT. ECON. 78, 79 (1991) (“Unequal 
bequests may occur when parents intend to compensate a less able child or to reinforce the 
advantage of one with greater ability.”); cf. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 48, at *12 (noting that 
restrictions on freedom of disposition “prevented many provident fathers from dividing or 
charging their estates as the exigence of their families required”). 
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time nor the institutional capacity to investigate the circumstances of each 
decedent to determine the optimal distribution.61 
Fourth, freedom of testation may strengthen family relationships.  Adam 
Hirsch and William Wang argue that this freedom “supports . . . a market 
for the provision of social services” and “encourages . . . beneficiaries to 
provide . . . care and comfort—services that add to the total economic 
‘pie.’”62  In addition, while altruism or love undoubtedly motivates many 
gifts within families, there is also the possibility of “strategic bequests.”63  
Some parents may use the threat of disinheritance to control the behavior of 
their children, for example, by inducing their children to provide greater 
care for them as they grow older.64  How often this threat of disinheritance 
affects the parties’ incentives is an empirical question.  While there is some 
evidence to suggest that the threat of disinheritance may be relevant for 
certain donors,65 there are also good reasons to be skeptical about this 
rationale.66  Nevertheless, testamentary freedom may provide parents with 
greater control over their children and encourage children to care for their 
parents. 
Overall, effectuating a donor’s ex ante interests is often consistent with 
maximizing social welfare.67  The law usually facilitates donative intent, as 
 
 61. See Pierre Pestieau, Gifts, Wills and Inheritance Law, in 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW 
AND ECONOMICS 96, 100 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2011) (“This 
relative superiority of the parents is often viewed as a key argument against any public 
interference with private intergenerational transfers.”). But cf. Frances H. Foster, Towards a 
Behavior-Based Model of Inheritance?:  The Chinese Experiment, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
77, 124 (1998) (“China’s behavior-based model of inheritance presents . . . a workable 
inheritance scheme of individualized justice that emphasizes judicial discretion rather than 
fixed rules.”); Paula A. Monopoli, “Deadbeat Dads”:  Should Support and Inheritance Be 
Linked?, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 257, 297 (1994) (“American inheritance law has been 
relatively less concerned with ‘fair’ reallocation of property at death because of its embrace 
of extensive freedom of testation and minimal forced heirship.”). 
 62. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 28, at 9–10; see also Gabrielle A. Brenner, Why Did 
Inheritance Laws Change?, 5 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 91 (1985). 
 63. See, e.g., B. Douglas Bernheim et al., The Strategic Bequest Motive, 93 J. POL. 
ECON. 1045 (1985); Tate, supra note 39. 
 64. SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 63 (discussing the control of children via conditional 
inheritance); see also Pestieau, supra note 61, at 109 (noting that several papers conclude 
that “the only way to induce children to perform and not to shirk responsibility while waiting 
for an inheritance is to allow their parents the possibility of disinheriting them”). 
 65. See Brenner, supra note 62, at 100 (discussing how preventing fathers from leaving 
a will “started to work against fathers, who could no longer compel either support or 
obedience from their children by the threat of disinheriting them”); Hirsch, supra note 29, at 
2234 n.209 (citing other historical examples). 
 66. See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 63 (“A problem with this argument . . . is that if 
a parent desires attention, it is not obvious why the parent cannot ‘purchase’ it through gifts 
during the parent’s lifetime (such as through large holiday presents or loans for the education 
of grandchildren).”); Hirsch & Wang, supra note 28, at 11 (“[T]he strongest argument 
against this rationale may be the practical observation that supplies of social services appear 
generally to be inelastic; they are forthcoming, in poor families as in rich, more or less 
irrespective of the suppliers’ inheritance prospects.”). 
 67. Maximizing social welfare is often the same as effectuating the donor’s interests, but 
not always.  For example, assume a dying mother will give $1,000 to her son and slightly 
prefers that the son use the money to attend the opera rather than as he pleases.  The son has 
no interest in the opera and would obtain much greater utility if he can use the money to 
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expressed in a donative document like a will or trust, because it serves as a 
useful approximation of a donor’s preferences.68  Just as the law views an 
owner’s use of property as evidence of its highest-value use, the law 
privileges donor intent as evidence of what maximizes the donor’s utility.  
By aggregating each donor’s preferences and “protecting the donor’s right 
to maximize her own utility, as reflected in her attempt to dispose of her 
property by gift,”69 the law may increase social welfare if the interests of 
donors generally converge with what is socially optimal. 
Thus, whether testamentary freedom is consistent with maximizing social 
welfare depends on whether donors act in ways that are consistent with 
their own interests and the interest of donees.  If “in most cases the public 
interest and the donor’s intent are compatible,”70 then the objective of 
promoting social welfare may justify adoption of testamentary freedom as 
the organizing principle of succession law.71 
C.  Legal Restrictions on Testamentary Freedom 
As discussed above, the organizing principle of American succession law 
is testamentary freedom.72  Effectuating a donor’s ex ante interests is not 
necessarily equivalent to maximizing social welfare.  Accordingly, as the 
Restatement (Third) of Property:  Wills and Other Donative Transfers 
points out, “American law curtails freedom of disposition only to the extent 
that the donor attempts to make a disposition or achieve a purpose that is 
prohibited or restricted by an overriding rule of law.”73  But what types of 
dispositions and purposes does the law prohibit or restrict? 
The Restatement (Third) of Property provides a nonexhaustive list of 
situations in which the law curtails testamentary freedom: 
Among the rules of law that prohibit or restrict freedom of disposition in 
certain instances are those relating to spousal rights; creditors’ rights; 
 
purchase a big screen television.  Here, requiring the son to attend the opera as a condition of 
the gift might decrease social welfare, even though doing so might be consistent with the 
donor’s intent. 
 68. See SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 65; see also Terry W. Frasier, Protecting Ecological 
Integrity Within the Balancing Function of Property Law, 28 ENVTL. L. 53, 88 (1998) (“We 
try to honor the donor’s intent, because the donor’s intent is the clue to what gave the donor 
the greatest utility from disposing of her property.”). 
 69. Frasier, supra note 68, at 88. 
 70. Craig Kauffman, Sympathy for the Devil’s Advocate:  Assisting the Attorney General 
When Charitable Matters Reach the Courtroom, 40 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 705, 707 
(2006). 
 71. Whether testamentary freedom is the optimal system of allocating property at death 
is beyond the scope of this Article.  Elsewhere, I analyze the advantages and disadvantages 
of testamentary freedom and compare it with alternative systems of succession, including 
forced heirship, family maintenance, and redistribution. See Daniel B. Kelly, Allocating 
Property at Death:  A Comparative Institutional Analysis of Succession Law (Nov. 4, 2013) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); cf. Halbach, supra note 6, at 5 (discussing 
the possibility that inheritance is the “least objectionable arrangement for dealing with 
property on the owner’s death”). 
 72. See supra Part I.A. 
 73. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:  WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 
cmt. c (2003) (emphasis added). 
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unreasonable restraints on alienation or marriage; provisions promoting 
separation or divorce; impermissible racial or other categoric restrictions; 
provisions encouraging illegal activity; and the rules against perpetuities 
and accumulations.74 
In each of these situations, there is, ostensibly, a countervailing policy for 
not effectuating the donor’s ex ante wishes.75  Similarly, the UPC qualifies 
the freedom of testation in several situations, including the elective share 
for surviving spouses,76 rule against perpetuities,77 and rights of creditors.78 
Just as a testator’s intent is the controlling consideration in interpreting a 
will, the settlor’s intent is “paramount” in construing a trust.79  But, once 
again, the law curtails a donor’s freedom of disposition because the settlor’s 
intention must yield to countervailing policy considerations under certain 
circumstances.  For example, section 404 of the Uniform Trust Code (UTC) 
states:  “A trust may be created only to the extent its purposes are lawful, 
not contrary to public policy, and possible to achieve.  A trust and its terms 
must be for the benefit of its beneficiaries.”80  This UTC provision imposes 
two requirements on the settler. 
First, a trust must be lawful, not contrary to public policy, and feasible.  
These are longstanding limitations on the settlor’s testamentary freedom of 
disposition.  Historically, courts invalidated trust provisions that were 
designed to evade taxes, violate banking laws, pay bribes, defraud creditors, 
interfere with family relationships, encourage divorce, and restrict freedom 
of religion.81  The UTC clarifies that a trust has an illegal purpose if “(1) its 
performance involves the commission of a criminal or tortious act by the 
trustee; (2) the settlor’s purpose in creating the trust was to defraud 
creditors or others; or (3) the consideration for the creation of the trust was 
illegal.”82  In addition, a trust violates “public policy” if it tends to 
“encourage criminal or tortious conduct,” “interfere with freedom to marry 
or encourage divorce,” “limit religious freedom,” or if its purpose is 
“frivolous or capricious.”83 
Second, under UTC section 404, “[a] trust and its terms must be for the 
benefit of its beneficiaries.”84  The comments to the UTC state, “The 
general purpose of trusts having identifiable beneficiaries is to benefit those 
beneficiaries in accordance with their interests as defined in the trust’s 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. See infra Part IV. 
 76. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-201 to -207, 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 101–21 (2010). 
 77. Id. §§ 2-901 to -902, 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 465–66. 
 78. Id. §§ 3-801 to -816, 8 U.L.A. pt. II, at 208–66. 
 79. In re Lowy, 931 A.2d 552, 556 (N.H. 2007). 
 80. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 404, 7C U.L.A. 484 (2010); see also Cooper, supra note 46, at 
1171 (noting that exceptions to the rule privileging a settlor’s intent were “few and far 
between, limited to cases where a trust provision encouraged illegal activity, fostered 
immorality, or otherwise violated public policy”). 
 81. See Cooper, supra note 46, at 1171 nn.21–23. 
 82. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 404 cmt., 7C U.L.A. at 484. 
 83. Id., 7C U.L.A. at 485. 
 84. Id. § 404, 7C U.L.A. at 484. 
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terms.”85  In reflecting on several recent developments in trust law, Edward 
Halbach points out that one theme is the “flexibility and efficiency in the 
pursuit of the best interests of trust beneficiaries within the settlor’s legally 
permissible objectives.”86  Notably, the UTC and Halbach both cabin the 
benefit-of-the-beneficiaries principle within the principle that trustees must 
act in accordance with the settlor’s instructions, a normative claim that 
Robert Sitkoff defends in developing an agency costs theory of trust law.87 
In addition, the idea that a trust must be for the benefit of beneficiaries 
has been a key issue in recent law reform proposals.  For example, in 
advocating for more flexibility for trustees in performing their fiduciary 
duties, John Langbein suggests replacing the trust rule requiring trustees to 
act in the “sole interest” of beneficiaries with the standard for fiduciaries in 
corporate law, which would require trustees to act in the “best interests” of 
beneficiaries.88  Furthermore, while a trust must benefit the beneficiaries, 
there is uncertainty about whether a settlor’s instructions can bind a trustee 
to act in a way that may be contrary to the beneficiaries’ own interests.89  
For example, if a trust contains a mandatory instruction to retain 
undiversified assets,90 does a trustee have a duty to diversify, given that 
diversification is seemingly in the best interests of the beneficiaries?91 
Below, I assess the extent to which a number of legal restrictions on 
testamentary freedom correspond with the economic justifications for 
restricting the freedom of testation.92  Yet, before doing so, I examine why 
the ex ante perspective is relevant in succession law in Part II, and analyze 
the underlying justifications for restricting testamentary freedom in Part III. 
II.  RELEVANCE OF THE EX ANTE PERSPECTIVE 
The distinction between ex ante and ex post analysis, though widely 
utilized in other contexts, has received little attention in succession law.  A 
handful of scholars mention situations in which ex ante analysis might be 
 
 85. Id. § 404 cmt., 7C U.L.A. at 485. 
 86. Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Uniform Acts, Restatements, and Trends in American Trust 
Law at Century’s End, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1877, 1881 (2000). 
 87. See Sitkoff, supra note 15, at 683 (“[L]aw should minimize the agency costs 
inherent in locating managerial authority with the trustee and the residual claim with the 
beneficiaries, but only to the extent that doing so is consistent with the ex ante instructions of 
the settlor.” (emphasis added)). 
 88. See Langbein, supra note 11. 
 89. Compare Cooper, supra note 46, at 1170, with Langbein, supra note 18, at 1112. 
 90. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 643–46 
(9th ed. 2013) (discussing permissive versus mandatory retention of inception assets and a 
trustee’s duty to diversify). 
 91. In an influential article on mandatory rules in trust law, Langbein contends that “the 
courts will come to view the advantages of diversification as so overwhelming that the 
settlor’s interference with effective diversification will be treated as inconsistent with the 
requirement that the trust terms must be for the benefit of the beneficiaries.” Langbein, supra 
note 18, at 1115 (“Settlor-directed underdiversification is an avoidable harm, akin to the 
harm that the courts have prevented by intervening against settlors’ directions to waste or 
destroy trust property.”). 
 92. See infra Part IV. 
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pertinent for probate and trust law.93  But there is no systematic account of 
why the ex ante/ex post distinction is significant or why these competing 
modes of analysis are useful in evaluating the justifications for restricting 
testamentary freedom.  In this Part, I analyze the ex ante/ex post distinction, 
illustrate its practical importance with an example from trust investment 
law, and highlight several ex ante considerations that are often overlooked. 
A.  The Ex Ante/Ex Post Distinction 
The ex ante/ex post distinction is an important concept in evaluating 
human behavior and the consequences of actions.94  The distinction, coined 
by Gunnar Myrdal, a Swedish economist and sociologist, is used widely in 
macroeconomics “to distinguish what is planned (i.e., ex ante) from what 
actually happens (i.e., ex post).”95  The distinction is also fundamental in 
analyzing legal rules and institutions.96  Legal theorist Lawrence Solum has 
stated, “If I had to select only one theoretical tool for a first-year law 
student to master, it would be the ex post/ex ante distinction.”97 
Why is the ex ante/ex post distinction relevant?  Ex post analysis looks at 
an event or dispute after the fact.98  Solum explains it this way:  “The ex 
post perspective is backward looking.  From the ex post point of view, we 
ask questions like:  Who acted badly and who acted well?  Whose rights 
were violated?”99  By contrast, ex ante analysis looks at an event or dispute 
before the fact.  We might ask:  “What [e]ffect will this rule have on the 
future?  Will deci[ding] . . . a case in this way produce good or bad 
consequences?”100  Thus, “[e]x post analysis tends to focus on fairness and 
distributional concerns, whereas ex ante analysis is more likely to consider 
incentives for future conduct.”101 
 
 93. See infra notes 140–46 and accompanying text. 
 94. In a recent article, I argue that a number of insights from economics and economic 
analysis of law, including the ex ante/ex post distinction, are useful in analyzing succession 
law. See Kelly, supra note 29, at 867–71.  This section expands on that earlier analysis of the 
ex ante perspective. 
 95. DONALD RUTHERFORD, ROUTLEDGE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 210 (2d ed. 2002) 
(ex ante, ex post entry). 
 96. See THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY S. SMITH, PROPERTY:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
60 (2d ed. 2012) (noting that “[e]conomists often speak of ‘ex ante’ analysis and ‘ex post’ 
analysis” and pointing out that “this locution has been picked up by courts in recent years”). 
 97. Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon 001:  Ex Ante & Ex Post, LEGAL THEORY 
LEXICON, http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2003/09/legal_theory_le_2.html 
(last updated Feb. 17, 2013); see also Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and Public Policy:  
Economic and Cognitive Perspectives, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 70 (1995) (“The policy analyst 
must always bear in mind that legal rules have ex ante consequences:  they affect the world 
both after and before the fact.” (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword:  The Court and the 
Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 10–12, 19–33 (1984))). 
 98. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 96, at 60; see also Kelly, supra note 29, at 867 (noting 
that the ex post view “attempts to arrive at an outcome or disposition which seeks to promote 
fairness, vindicate rights, or maximize social welfare based on prior events”). 
 99. Solum, supra note 97. 
 100. Id. 
 101. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 96, at 64; see also Kelly, supra note 29, at 868 (noting 
that the ex ante perspective “recognizes that the selection of a legal rule can often have an 
effect on a party’s incentives”). 
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Most economically oriented legal scholars conclude that the ex ante 
perspective is a superior mode of legal and policy analysis.  Louis Kaplow 
and Steven Shavell contend that “relying on an ex post view, when it differs 
from the ex ante perspective, always entails favoring a legal policy under 
which everyone is worse off ex ante.”102  That is, if policy A is socially 
optimal ex ante, and policy B is socially optimal ex post, moving from A to 
B is undesirable (and makes everyone worse off); conversely, moving from 
B to A is socially desirable (and makes everyone better off).  The ex ante 
view has at least two distinct advantages. 
First, ex ante analysis incorporates the idea that “the choice of legal rules 
may affect how individuals behave at the outset, which often has an 
important influence on individuals’ well-being.”103  The claim is not that 
law will always affect the actions of the parties.  In certain circumstances, 
parties may take the same actions, irrespective of the applicable legal rule, 
due to underlying social norms or moral considerations.104  Rather, the 
claim is that, in many situations, parties may change their behavior based 
on the law.  Consider, for example, the time and money many individuals 
spend consulting lawyers and financial advisors to update their estate plans 
in response to changes in the tax code.105  By contrast, “when one adopts an 
ex post perspective, one often ignores important effects of legal rules.”106 
Second, ex ante analysis avoids the possibility of “hindsight bias.”107  
Hindsight bias, known colloquially as “Monday morning 
 
 102. LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 439 (2002); see 
also POSNER, supra note 19, at 9 (“This discussion of sunk costs should help explain the 
emphasis that economists place on the ex ante (before the fact) rather than ex post (after the 
fact) perspective.”).  Maximizing social welfare requires an ex ante view (which implicitly 
incorporates ex post considerations). 
 103. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1158, 
1356 (2001). 
 104. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW:  HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES 52–53 (1991) (finding that, in cattle disputes in Shasta County, California, 
allegiance to an “overarching norm of cooperation” is “wholly independent of formal legal 
entitlements”). 
 105. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Cooper, Ghosts of 1932:  The Lost History of Estate and Gift 
Taxation, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 875, 902 (2010); Carolyn Burgess Featheringill, Estate Tax 
Apportionment and Nonprobate Assets:  Picking the Right Pocket, 21 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 42 
(1990). 
 106. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 103, at 1356.  The point is not only that law may 
affect how individuals behave but that changes in how parties behave may affect their well-
being.  If a change in the tax code causes a client to adopt Estate Planning Strategy 2, rather 
than Estate Planning Strategy 1, it is not simply a matter of a client telling her attorney to 
draft a different provision in her will.  Instead, all else equal, without the legal change, the 
donor may prefer Estate Planning Strategy 1.  If a client adopts Estate Planning Strategy 2 
because of some exogenous legal change, then switching from Strategy 1 to Strategy 2 
reduces the client’s satisfaction.  Thus, the substantive content of legal rules may alter how 
individuals act at the outset, which in turn may affect their happiness. 
 107. On hindsight bias, see, for example, Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight ≠ Foresight:  The 
Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
PSYCHOL.:  HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288 (1975), and Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski, Ex Post ≠ Ex Ante:  Determining Liability in Hindsight, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 89 
(1995). 
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quarterbacking,”108 is a tendency of humans to “overestimate the 
predictability of past events—both overstating their ability to have 
predicted past events and believing others should have been able to predict 
these events.”109  Ex ante analysis attempts to avoid hindsight bias by 
considering “all possible outcomes an individual might experience” rather 
than merely a salient, perhaps atypical, outcome that happens to occur.110  
As Kaplow and Shavell emphasize, comprehensively evaluating a legal rule 
“requires considering all possible outcomes an individual might experience, 
not just a particular one that may involve bad luck.”111  Thus, a proper 
evaluation of a legal rule—that is, an evaluation that incorporates ex ante 
considerations, not just ex post concerns—“weights all possibilities by their 
probabilities precisely to avoid granting excessive weight to a particular 
subset of outcomes.”112 
B.  Example:  Hindsight Bias in Trust Investment Law 
To illustrate, consider a trustee’s fiduciary duty in trust investment law.  
A trustee owes a duty of prudence to the beneficiaries of a trust.  Under this 
duty, trustees must act consistent with an objective standard of care.113  
Today, the primary application of this duty is in trust investment law:  the 
trustee must invest assets with prudence.  Over time the rule governing this 
duty has shifted from the “prudent man rule” to a “prudent investor rule.”114  
One problem with the prudent man rule was that courts allowed hindsight 
bias to affect their evaluation of a trustee’s performance. 
Prior to the prudent man rule, most jurisdictions relied on “legal list” 
statutes.115  These statutes restricted trustees to choosing certain “safe” 
investments like bonds and first mortgages.116  Eventually, to replace such 
statutes and give trustees more flexibility, most states adopted the prudent 
man rule.117  Under this rule, the trustee was “to make such investments and 
only such investments as a prudent man would make of his own property 
having in view the preservation of the estate and the amount and regularity 
of the income to be derived.”118 
 
 108. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1457 (Philip Babcock Gove 
ed., 1993) (defining a “Monday morning quarterback” as “a person who using hindsight 
criticizes what others have done”). 
 109. Avishalom Tor, The Methodology of the Behavioral Analysis of Law, 4 HAIFA L. 
REV. 237, 253 (2008). 
 110. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 103, at 1356. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 804, 7C U.L.A. 601 (2010) (“A trustee shall administer the 
trust as a prudent person would, by considering the purposes, terms, distributional 
requirements, and other circumstances of the trust.  In satisfying this standard, the trustee 
shall exercise reasonable care, skill, and caution.”). 
 114. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS ch. 17 introductory note (2007). 
 115. See John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Market Funds and Trust-Investment 
Law (pt. 1), 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1, 3–4. 
 116. Id. at 4. 
 117. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS ch. 17 introductory note. 
 118. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 227 (1959). 
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But a major problem with the prudent man rule was hindsight bias.  In 
applying the rule, courts often exhibited hindsight bias in evaluating the 
outcome of specific investments.119  If a trustee selected a higher risk 
investment (e.g., securities), and the investment did not pay off, the trustee 
faced liability for “speculating” in the stock, even if the investment was a 
reasonable one at the time it was made.  Thus, due to hindsight bias, courts 
had a proclivity to focus on the actual performance of an investment, 
without considering the likelihood of all possible outcomes. 
A classic example of hindsight bias is In re Chamberlain’s Estate.120  
The case involved trust investments made in August 1929, three months 
before the stock market crash in October 1929.  In ruling against the 
trustees for failing to sell more quickly, the court opined:  “It was common 
knowledge, not only amongst bankers and trust companies, but the general 
public as well, that the stock market condition [in August 1929] was an 
unhealthy one, that values were very much inflated, and that a crash was 
almost sure to occur.”121  If it was in fact “common knowledge” that values 
were inflated, investors would have started to sell then, not three months 
later.122  From the court’s perspective (after the fact), the stock market crash 
was inevitable.  Yet, from an investor’s perspective (before the fact), the ex 
ante probability of a crash may have been relatively small.  Thus, a decision 
not to sell in August 1929 was not necessarily an unreasonable one. 
Social scientists have noted a proclivity among courts to exhibit 
hindsight bias in many situations, including the evaluation of investment 
decisions by trustees.  For example, in analyzing the heuristics and biases of 
courts, Jeffrey Rachlinksi notes that “courts judging the liability of trustees 
have not cleverly adapted to the hindsight bias, but have fallen prey to its 
influence.”123  According to Rachlinski: 
As a consequence of their reliance on hindsight, courts continuously 
declared investments of certain types to be speculative.  Because of the 
hindsight bias, any investment with the potential to lose money could 
have given rise to liability; the riskier the investment, the more likely that 
it would result in liability.  Consequently, the prudent-[man] rule evolved 
from a flexible standard of liability into a source of constraints on trustees 
developed by adjudication in hindsight.124 
In testing whether hindsight bias affects judges, Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey 
Rachlinski, and Andrew Wistrich find that “judges exhibited a predictable 
hindsight bias.”125  If judges “learned that a particular outcome had 
occurred, they were much more likely to identify that outcome as the most 
 
 119. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 90, at 619 (noting the “prevalence of 
hindsight bias in its application by courts”). 
 120. 156 A. 42, 43 (N.J. Prerog. Ct. 1931). 
 121. Id. at 43. 
 122. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 90, at 619. 
 123. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts:  Ignorance or 
Adaptation?, 79 OR. L. REV. 61, 79 (2000). 
 124. Id. at 80. 
 125. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 
86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 803 (2001). 
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likely to have occurred.”126  In addition, Guthrie, Rachlinski, and Wistrich 
note several cases, including Chamberlain, in which trustees became 
“victims of the hindsight bias.”127 
Not all courts succumb to judging by hindsight.128  For example, in 
Robison v. Elston Bank & Trust Co.,129 a case decided over seventy years 
ago, an Indiana intermediate appellate court emphasized that judges should 
evaluate a trustee’s exercise of due care “in the light of circumstances 
existing at the time the action was taken, and not in the light of subsequent 
events which could not be reasonably anticipated.”130  The court pointed 
out that judging the trustee’s actions in hindsight could have perverse 
consequences:  “For a trustee’s actions to be judged in the light of hindsight 
would discourage prudent men from undertaking any trust.”131 
The problem with judging the trustees’ investments with the benefit of 
hindsight is not only the erroneous decisions themselves.  Rather, these 
erroneous decisions can affect the parties’ incentives at the outset.  
Knowing they could be liable for “imprudent” investments, trustees learned 
not to engage in “risky” investments; instead, many trustees adopted 
investment strategies that were overly cautious relative to each 
beneficiary’s risk profile.132  As a result, because investment strategies were 
too conservative, the prudent man rule actually harmed the beneficiaries.  
Even though a particular beneficiary may have succeeded in arguing that a 
trustee violated the duty of prudence because an investment turned out 
poorly in hindsight, the fact that trustees would have an incentive to choose 
investments with little risk meant smaller returns for future beneficiaries.  
Put another way, beneficiaries may have wanted the courts to evaluate 
investments with the benefit of hindsight after the fact, but these same 
beneficiaries would not want courts to judge by hindsight before the fact.  
Doing so would distort the incentives of the trustees and reduce the wealth 
of the beneficiaries.  Despite the problem of hindsight bias and several other 
flaws, the prudent man rule persisted.133 
Eventually, due to the influence of several articles by John Langbein and 
Judge Richard Posner,134 trust investment law began to recognize the 
 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 804 (citing First Ala. Bank of Montgomery v. Martin, 425 So. 2d 415, 428 
(Ala. 1982); Chase v. Peaver, 419 N.E.2d 1358, 1368 (Mass. 1981); In re Chamberlain’s 
Estate, 156 A. 42, 42–43 (N.J. Prerog. Ct. 1931)). 
 128. A number of courts avoided hindsight bias in concluding that a trustee’s actions 
should be evaluated at the time of a trustee’s decision. See, e.g., Dennis v. R.I. Hosp. Trust 
Nat’l Bank, 571 F. Supp. 623 (D.R.I. 1983); In re Estate of Janes, 681 N.E.2d 332 (N.Y. 
1997). 
 129. 48 N.E.2d 181 (Ind. App. 1943). 
 130. Id. at 190. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See Rachlinski, supra note 123, at 81 (“[T]hese courts easily lapsed into the 
language of judging in hindsight, thereby driving other trustees into overly cautious 
investment strategies.”). 
 133. Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Puzzling Persistence of the Constrained Prudent Man Rule, 
62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 52 (1987). 
 134. See Langbein & Posner, supra note 115; John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, 
Market Funds and Trust-Investment Law:  II, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1; John H. 
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problem of hindsight bias and incorporate insights from modern portfolio 
theory.135  Accordingly, courts started to abandon the prudent man rule and 
adopt a new approach:  the prudent investor rule.136  The prudent investor 
rule explicitly warns against the dangers of hindsight bias.  Specifically, the 
rule recognizes that the determination of whether a trustee has breached a 
duty of prudence depends on whether a trustee acts consistently with the 
duty ex ante, not whether the investments turned out poorly ex post.137 
The prudent investor rule not only assists courts in deciding cases 
correctly but also helps ensure that a trustee’s incentive to invest converges 
with the investments that would be in the best interests of the beneficiaries.  
Hence, reducing hindsight bias in judicial decisionmaking is beneficial for 
beneficiaries ex ante, even though particular beneficiaries will no longer be 
able to assert claims for breach of fiduciary duty in cases in which the 
trustee’s investments turn out poorly ex post.  To be sure, even under a 
prudent investor rule, some courts may continue to exhibit hindsight bias.138  
But the law’s evolution from the prudent man rule to a prudent investor rule 
illustrates the importance of the ex ante perspective. 
C.  Incorporating Ex Ante Considerations 
In many areas of the law, legal policy can diverge from the socially 
optimal result because a legislature or court adopts an ex post perspective 
and ignores ex ante considerations.  The law of succession is no exception.  
A handful of legal scholars, including Adam Hirsch,139 John Langbein,140 
 
Langbein & Richard A. Posner, The Revolution in Trust Investment Law, 62 A.B.A. J. 764 
(1976). 
 135. See HARRY M. MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION:  EFFICIENT DIVERSIFICATION OF 
INVESTMENTS (1959); Harry M. Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952); see also 
Edwin J. Elton & Martin J. Gruber, Modern Portfolio Theory, 1950 to Date, 21 J. BANKING 
& FIN. 1743 (1997) (surveying the literature and history). 
 136. See, e.g., Nelson v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Williston, 543 F.3d 432, 434–36 
(8th Cir. 2008) (concluding that the trustee conformed with the prudent investor rule); In re 
Estate of Cooper, 913 P.2d 393, 395 (Wash. App. 1996) (“We hold the prudent investor rule 
focuses on the performance of the trustee, not the results of the trust.”). 
 137. UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 8, 7B U.L.A. 38 (2006) (“Compliance with the 
prudent investor rule is determined in light of the facts and circumstances existing at the time 
of a trustee’s decision or action and not by hindsight.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS 
§ 90 cmt. b (2007) (“[C]ompliance with these fiduciary standards is to be judged as of the 
time the investment decision in question was made, not with the benefit of hindsight or by 
taking account of developments that occurred after the time of a decision to make, retain, or 
sell an investment.”). 
 138. See Guthrie et al., supra note 125, at 821 (“[J]udges applying the prudent-investor 
rule to cases of trustee liability seem also to have fallen prey to the hindsight bias.”). 
 139. See, e.g., Hirsch, supra note 49, at 70–71, 82 (spendthrift trusts); Adam J. Hirsch, 
Fear Not the Asset Protection Trust, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685, 2695–96 (2006) (asset 
protection trusts); Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance and Inconsistency, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1057, 
1066, 1123, 1127 n.213 (1996) (executing, reforming, updating wills); Adam J. Hirsch, 
Revisions in Need of Revising:  The Uniform Disclaimer of Property Interests Act, 29 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 109, 146 (2001) (disclaimer); Adam J. Hirsch, Text and Time:  A Theory of 
Testamentary Obsolescence, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 609, 615, 626 (2009) (capacity and 
impossibility). 
 140. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 11, at 937, 972 (duty of loyalty). 
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Robert Sitkoff,141 and Stewart Sterk,142 mention situations in which ex ante 
analysis is relevant in probate or trust law.143  Moreover, as discussed, 
Langbein and Posner helped to revolutionize trust investment law by 
emphasizing hindsight bias and other flaws with the prudent man rule.144  
But there are few attempts to analyze ex ante considerations in succession 
law more systematically. 
This Article discusses a number of ex ante considerations that are 
relevant in succession law, including (1) the donor’s happiness; (2) the 
donor’s incentive to accumulate property; (3) the structure and timing of 
gifts; and (4) other ex ante considerations. These ex ante considerations, 
while often overlooked, are critical in accurately evaluating the normative 
justifications for restricting testamentary freedom.145 
1.  Donor’s Happiness 
A legal rule or judicial decision that interferes with a donor’s disposition 
after death may affect the donor’s happiness during life.  Of course, after 
death, a donor does not suffer disutility.  Thus, ex post, a legislature or 
court may ignore the effect of a rule or decision on the donor.  However, 
overlooking the donor’s happiness during life may result in adopting a legal 
rule that is socially undesirable. 
The ex ante perspective incorporates the satisfaction of a donor—even if 
a donor is dead—not just the interests of the donees.  Courts have long 
recognized the importance of the donor’s happiness.  For example, seventy-
five years ago, the D.C. Circuit announced: 
Perhaps the wishes of the dead should not concern the living, but our legal 
system is built on a different theory.  Many living persons derive 
satisfaction from the thought that they can control the devolution of their 
property.  In distributing decedents’ estates the law undertakes, within 
 
 141. See, e.g., Sitkoff, supra note 15, at 657–71 (trust modification and termination, 
trustee removal, settlor standing, trust protectors); Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust Law, Corporate 
Law, and Capital Market Efficiency, 28 J. CORP. L. 565, 577–78 (2003) (trust management). 
 142. Stewart E. Sterk, Rethinking Trust Law Reform:  How Prudent Is Modern Prudent 
Investor Doctrine?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 851, 889–91 (2010) (prudent investment). 
 143. For other examples, see David Horton, Unconscionability in the Law of Trusts, 84 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1675, 1700–01 (2009) (testamentary freedom and unconscionability), 
and Peter T. Wendell, The Evolution of the Law of Trustee’s Powers and Third Party 
Liability for Participating in a Breach of Trust:  An Economic Analysis, 35 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 971, 1010–12 (2005) (duties of a trustee and liability of third parties). 
 144. See supra notes 134–37 and accompanying text. 
 145. Many ex ante considerations (e.g., the donor’s happiness and donor’s incentives) are 
relevant for evaluating restrictions on testamentary freedom only if the donor knows about 
the restriction.  For purposes of this analysis, I assume that donors are aware of the law.  
This assumption is likely warranted for most donors, given the role of the estate planning 
attorney.  If the donor (or the donor’s attorney) was somehow unaware of the restriction or 
the risk of legal intervention (e.g., suppose that courts did not publish prior decisions 
restricting testamentary freedom), then it may be possible for the law to maximize the 
donees’ interests ex post while not affecting the donor’s utility or incentives ex ante, 
although this scenario is unlikely except in unusual circumstances. Cf. Stake, supra note 57, 
at 757 (discussing how the rule against perpetuities, due to its complexity, might avoid the 
conflict between generations because of a donor’s “beneficial misapprehension” of the rule). 
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limits, to follow the wishes of the former owners as manifested by will or 
intestacy.146 
Indeed, one of the primary justifications for testamentary freedom is that 
“owners gain personal satisfaction from bequeathing property.”147 
Modern scholars in law and economics, as well as trusts and estates, 
agree that a donor’s satisfaction is relevant.  As noted above, in analyzing 
whether society should intervene in private decisions to bequeath property, 
Shavell notes that interfering with bequests “tends to reduce individuals’ 
utility directly.”148  That is, “a person will derive less utility from property 
if he wants to bequeath it but is prevented from doing so.”149  Likewise, in 
discussing arguments for dead hand control, Shavell points out that 
controlling property after death is simply “a way of using property.”150  
Consequently, “a benchmark for thought is that society should not interfere 
with parties’ desires to control property long after their deaths.”151  
Similarly, a number of economically oriented scholars in wills, trusts, and 
estates have highlighted the importance of donor satisfaction, as well.152 
A donor may derive happiness from giving because of self-interest or 
altruism.  If the happiness is related to mere self-interest, a donor obtains 
satisfaction from the act of giving itself.  James Andreoni describes this as 
“warm-glow giving” because the donor experiences a warm glow simply by 
making the gift.153  The distinguishing characteristic of this type of self-
interested giving is that the act of giving “may supply utility to the donor, 
independently of the degree of satisfaction it renders the donee.”154  Other 
types of self-interested giving may be based on exchange or reciprocity.155 
A gift also may increase the donor’s happiness due to altruism.156  If a 
donor is altruistic, the donor’s utility is a function of the donees’ utility, i.e., 
 
 146. Webb v. Lohnes, 96 F.2d 582, 584 (D.C. Cir. 1938). 
 147. Hirsch, supra note 49, at 51; see also supra Part I.B. 
 148. SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 65. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 68. 
 151. Id. 
 152. See, e.g., Halbach, supra note 6, at 5 (“[I]t is a great comfort and satisfaction to 
know during life that, even after death, those whom one cares about can be provided for and 
may be able to enjoy better lives because of the inheritance that can be left to them.”); Hirsch 
& Wang, supra note 28, at 8 (“To the extent that lawmakers deny persons the opportunity to 
bequeath freely, the subjective value of property will drop, for one of its potential uses will 
have disappeared.”). 
 153. James Andreoni, Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods:  A Theory of 
Warm-Glow Giving, 100 ECON. J. 464, 464–77 (1990). 
 154. SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 58. 
 155. See Erik Schokkaert, The Empirical Analysis of Transfer Motives, in 1 HANDBOOK 
OF THE ECONOMICS OF GIVING, ALTRUISM, AND RECIPROCITY 127, 132–33, 166–68 (Serge-
Christophe Kolm & Jean Mercier Ythier eds., 2006) (discussing reciprocity as a motivation 
for giving and comparing altruism with exchange or reciprocity). 
 156. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 19, at 688 (noting that one “explanation for bequests is 
the motive of altruism”).  For an extended discussion of altruism in intergenerational 
transfers, see Barbara H. Fried, Who Gets Utility from Bequests?  The Distributive and 
Welfare Implications for a Consumption Tax, 51 STAN. L. REV. 641 (1999). 
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the preferences of the donor incorporate the well-being of donees.157  For 
example, parents may pay college tuition for a child because the parents’ 
happiness depends on the child’s happiness.158  A grantor may execute a 
discretionary support trust to benefit a spouse because the grantor takes 
comfort knowing the spouse will have financial support after the grantor’s 
death.  A philanthropist may donate money to charity because she believes 
that advancing science, relieving poverty, or promoting public health will 
improve the welfare of others. 
By contrast, the ex post perspective may ignore the donor’s utility.  If a 
donor is dead, a court may elevate the interests of donees, even if doing so 
harms the donor.  Some courts and commentators may overlook the fact 
that disregarding a donor’s intent after death may decrease the donor’s 
happiness during life.  One scholar characterizes the ex post view in this 
way:  “Protecting the intent of a deceased testator over the interest of living 
individuals rarely fares well when viewed from an ex post perspective.”159  
He asks, “What sense does it make for society to allow the wishes of the 
deceased to trump the happiness of the living?”160  Another scholar puts it 
more bluntly:  “I can’t believe that reverence for some dead guy’s intent is 
going to determine major outcomes.”161 
Adopting an ex post view that privileges the interests of donees over the 
wishes of donors is often based on an erroneous assumption.  Specifically, 
this view assumes that restricting a donor’s ability to transfer property at 
death will not affect a donor’s utility during life.  But such an assumption is 
warranted only if living donors continue to believe the law will effectuate 
their intent, even though courts regularly disregard the intent of similarly 
situated donors.162  Shavell notes that “individuals who desire dead hand 
control will in fact suffer utility losses when they are alive, assuming that 
they anticipate that property will not be used in the way they want when 
they are dead.”163  Thus, courts will reach the correct result only if the law 
 
 157. See SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 58 (observing that a “major motivation” for gift 
giving is “pure altruism” in which a “donor cares about the well-being of the donee” and 
“obtains utility from the utility of the donee”); see also Steven Shavell, An Economic 
Analysis of Altruism and Deferred Gifts, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 401, 402 (1991) (employing a 
model in which “the donor’s utility includes a component equal to the donee’s utility 
multiplied by a parameter called the donor’s degree of altruism,” and so “the donor’s utility 
will be higher the greater his degree of altruism or the larger the donee’s utility”). 
 158. Cf. Chu, supra note 60, at 93 (“The model of altruism toward children usually 
assumes that the family head intends to maximize a dynastic utility function.”). 
 159. Lee-ford Tritt, Technical Correction or Tectonic Shift:  Competing Default Rule 
Theories Under the New Uniform Probate Code, 61 ALA. L. REV. 273, 288 (2010). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Dobris, supra note 13, at 2548–49. 
 162. Cf. Stake, supra note 57, at 757. 
 163. SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 68; cf. Paul H. Brietzke, New Wrinkles in Law . . . and 
Economics, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 105, 121 n.42 (1997) (noting that, even though “Coasian 
bargains are impossible because the grantor is dead . . . the common law continues to respect 
the grantor’s interests because . . . of the putative ex ante efficiency of allowing her to rule 
from beyond the grave” (citing UGO MATTEI, COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS 174 
(1997))); J.D. Trout & Shahid A. Buttar, Resurrecting “Death Taxes”:  Inheritance, 
Redistribution, and the Science of Happiness, 16 J.L. & POL. 765, 789–90 (2000) (arguing 
that one who is dead cannot have desires but acknowledging that “what will happen after one 
1150 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
views the problem ex ante and incorporates the donor’s happiness during 
life.164 
2.  Donor’s Incentive To Accumulate Property 
A legal rule or decision that alters a donor’s disposition after death also 
may affect the donor’s incentive to accumulate property during life.  For 
example, if a donor believes a court will not effectuate her intent, then the 
donor may have less incentive to work, less incentive to save and invest, 
and a greater incentive to consume property.  The ex ante view incorporates 
the fact that the choice of legal rules may affect the incentive to accumulate 
property, including a donor’s incentive to work, save, and invest.165  By 
contrast, an ex post view may ignore that the choice of rules affects a 
donor’s incentive to accumulate property.  By ignoring such considerations, 
courts may distort behavior in several ways that are undesirable. 
If a donor anticipates a restriction on testamentary freedom, the donor 
may have an incentive to work less during life.  Bequeathing property is 
one way of using property, so altering gifts may lower the incentive to 
work:  “[A] person will not work as hard to accumulate property if he 
cannot then bequeath it as he pleases.”166  This distortion in the incentive to 
work has social implications as well because “thwarted testators will choose 
to accumulate less property, and the total stock of wealth existing at any 
given time will shrink.”167  Thus, legal intervention in the decision to 
bequeath property may reduce the incentive of donors to work. 
Likewise, if a testator thinks a court may disregard donative intent, the 
testator may save less and consume more.  If a legal rule makes bequeathing 
 
is dead is relevant to one’s level of welfare” because, “[f]or example, one might be 
concerned that, without an inheritance, one’s offspring would be left vulnerable, and this 
worry about the future of one’s offspring may erode one’s happiness”). 
 164. To illustrate, consider an example.  Suppose D gives $100,000 to C in a testamentary 
trust for C’s college expenses.  During life, the marginal utility to D of knowing that C will 
be able to access the money for college (rather than for some other purpose) is $30,000.  
After D dies, C attempts to terminate the trust.  Assume that the value to C of using the 
money for college is $90,000, but the value to C of using the money to enter a poker 
competition is $110,000.  From an ex post view, a court should terminate the trust because 
the value to C of owning the property outright ($110,000) exceeds the value to C of owning 
the property in trust ($90,000), and D is dead.  However, from an ex ante view, a court 
should effectuate D’s intent because ex ante analysis incorporates D’s utility during life, in 
addition to C’s utility.  Here, the value to D and C of not terminating the trust ($30,000 + 
$90,000 = $120,000) exceeds the value to D and C of terminating the trust ($0 + $110,000 = 
$110,000).  As noted above, effectuating a donor’s interests is not always equivalent to 
maximizing social welfare, because an increase in the donee’s utility ex post might outweigh 
any decrease in the donor’s utility ex ante (assuming there are no other ex ante 
consequences). See supra note 67. 
 165. The incentive to accumulate property is related to a donor’s satisfaction during life.  
Hirsch points out that, because “testamentary freedom adds to the utility owners derive from 
what they acquire,” effectuating the wishes of donors “enhances their incentive both to 
produce and to save wealth.” Hirsch, supra note 49, at 51. 
 166. SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 65. 
 167. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 28, at 8.  The existence and magnitude of this effect on 
the donor’s incentive to accumulate property are empirical questions, although there is little 
empirical research on such questions except in the context of estate taxation. 
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property less attractive relative to consuming property, the testator may 
have an incentive to save less.168  If so, the testator may have less property 
in her estate to transfer to donees at death.  The idea applies not only to 
wills but also to trusts:  “Individuals who know that their intent cannot be 
carried out in a trust may behave differently:  they may choose to spend 
money during their lifetime that they might have left for their descendants 
in a trust.”169  Thus, restrictions on testamentary freedom may result in 
excessive consumption relative to savings. 
At first glance, this result may seem to benefit the donor—after all, the 
donor now consumes more during life.  But consuming more and giving 
less actually reduces a donor’s utility.  All other things being equal, the 
donor would prefer giving the property to others rather than consuming it.  
In the absence of a legal limitation or judicial intervention, the donor would 
have saved and donated the property, rather than consuming it, consistent 
with the donor’s preferences.  In addition, if a donor consumes more and 
saves less, this additional consumption is detrimental to donees.  Because 
the donor will save less, the donor will have less property to transmit to 
donees at the time of the donor’s death.  Thus, from a social perspective, the 
excessive consumption is undesirable because it harms the donor and the 
donees and reduces the overall savings rate.170 
One objection is whether individuals will in fact work less or save less if 
they anticipate being unable to bequeath property.171  Even assuming 
restrictions on testamentary freedom have little or no impact on most 
people’s incentive to work, they may affect certain types of donors.  
Suppose a donor has enough money to satisfy his own needs, wants, and 
desires, as well as those of his children, and plans to give future earnings to 
charity or his grandchildren.  This donor might prefer to work as a CEO for 
several more years, not only because his wisdom and experience are useful 
to the company but also so that he can support his favorite charities and 
help provide for his grandchildren’s future.  Alternatively, the donor could 
retire to Arizona or Florida.  Assuming he is still a productive executive, 
 
 168. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 19, at 688 (“[H]eavy estate taxation, by raising the 
price of posthumous consumption relative to present consumption, will reduce the incentive 
to save and increase the incentive to consume.”); cf. Joshua C. Tate, Conditional Love:  
Incentive Trusts and the Inflexibility Problem, 41 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 445, 479 (2006)  
(“[W]hen the law imposes a mandatory rule with respect to trusts, it may have an impact on 
what potential settlors do with their money.”). 
 169. Tate, supra note 168, at 479.  Again, the existence and magnitude of this effect are 
empirical questions. 
 170. See Halbach, supra note 6, at 6. 
 171. Does limiting freedom of disposition have any marginal effect on an individual’s 
decision to work, in terms of the number of years, the number of hours per week, or the 
types of employment opportunities they pursue?  Or will donors work the same regardless of 
the laws governing succession?  Similarly, does limiting freedom of disposition have any 
effect on an individual’s decision to save rather than consume?  For an analysis of wealth 
transfer taxation that cites to a number of early empirical studies related to this issue, see 
Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE L.J. 283, 
318–21 (1994). 
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reducing the CEO’s incentive to continue working would be socially 
undesirable.172 
Another objection is that even if a rule decreases a donor’s incentive to 
work (suppose the CEO retires three years early), any loss of productivity 
may be offset by an increase in the donees’ incentives to work (the CEO’s 
grandchildren will have to study and work harder).  In discussing estate 
taxation, Judge Richard Posner argues that, for this reason, “aggregate 
effects of heavy estate taxation on work, saving, and consumption are 
probably slight.”173  Posner asserts that “the diminished incentive of heavily 
taxed potential testators to work hard may be offset by the increased 
incentive of their potential heirs to work hard.”174 
The net effect of restricting testamentary freedom on the donor’s and 
donees’ incentive to work is ultimately an empirical question.  Andrew 
Carnegie famously suggested that “the parent who leaves his son enormous 
wealth generally deadens the talents and energies of the son, and tempts 
him to lead a less useful and less worthy life than he otherwise would.”175  
In an empirical study testing Carnegie’s conjecture, Douglas Hotz-Easkin, 
David Joulfaian, and Harvey Rosen found that sizable inheritances do 
decrease a person’s participation in the labor force.176  However, there is 
relatively little evidence comparing the relative magnitude of the effect on 
donees with the effect on donors. 
Posner and Carnegie are correct that, theoretically, a bequest may affect a 
donee’s incentives in socially undesirable ways.  On the other hand, there 
are several reasons why the effect on donor behavior may still be relevant, 
and why this effect may outweigh any adverse effects on donees.  First, the 
social loss from a decline in the donor’s labor may exceed the social loss 
from any decline in the donees’ labor.  Second, given the diminishing 
marginal utility of wealth, the same property may result in more happiness 
in the hands of the donees than in the hands of the donor, if the donor’s 
wealth exceeds the wealth of individual donees.  Third, a gift may have 
little or no effect on the incentive of donees to work if the donor gives the 
property to a charity rather than individuals (grandchildren).177  Fourth, like 
 
 172. If a worker is not a productive member of the labor force, then providing incentives 
for the worker to retire may increase productivity. See Xavier X. Sala-i-Martin, A Positive 
Theory of Social Security, 1 J. ECON. GROWTH 277, 277 (1996) (suggesting that “pensions 
are a means to induce retirement—that is, to buy the elderly out of the labor force because 
aggregate output is higher if the elderly do not work”). 
 173. POSNER, supra note 19, at 689. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Andrew Carnegie, The Advantages of Poverty, in THE “GOSPEL OF WEALTH” ESSAYS 
AND OTHER WRITINGS 31, 38 (David Nasaw ed., Penguin Grp. 2006) (1891). 
 176. See Douglas Hotz-Easkin, David Joulfaian & Harvey S. Rosen, The Carnegie 
Conjecture:  Some Empirical Evidence, 108 Q.J. ECON. 413, 432 (1993) (“[F]amilies with 
one or two earners who received inheritances above $150,000 were about three times more 
likely to reduce their labor force participation to zero than families with inheritances below 
$25,000.”). 
 177. The gift may affect the incentives of the charity in other ways, for example, reducing 
the need for the charity to raise funds.  Conversely, if a restriction on testamentary freedom 
causes the donor to switch from a charitable beneficiary to an individual donee, then the 
restriction may have negative effects on the incentives of both the donor and donee. 
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Carnegie, many affluent donors are aware of this problem and take 
measures, including the use of incentive trusts, to mitigate any adverse 
effect on donees.178 
Overall, ignoring the effect of limitations on testamentary freedom on the 
donor’s incentive to save and invest would be similar to ignoring the impact 
of an estate tax on the incentive to save and consume.179  To be sure, the 
magnitude of this effect is difficult to estimate empirically, and the effect 
may be offset to a certain extent by a greater incentive for future 
generations to accumulate wealth.180  However, the effect on the donor’s 
incentive to save and invest should be a relevant consideration. 
3.  Structure and Timing of the Donor’s Gifts 
In addition to affecting the donor’s happiness and incentive to save and 
invest, the applicable legal rule might alter the donor’s ex ante behavior by 
affecting the structure and timing of gifts.  Specifically, the choice of rule 
may affect the timing of a gift, the identity of donees, and the size of a gift, 
including whether or not the donor decides to give a gift at all. 
First, ex ante analysis recognizes that the law may affect the timing of a 
gift.  A donor may transfer property during life (“inter vivos” gifts), at death 
(“testamentary” gifts), or even after death (gifts made in trust).  Because the 
“legal policies controlling inheritance can be partially circumvented by 
increases in inter vivos gifts,” individuals may opt to transfer property 
during life rather than at death.181  For example, shortly after enacting the 
estate tax, Congress had to enact a gift tax to prevent donors from 
circumventing the estate tax by giving away their property during life.  As a 
result, it may be difficult and costly to curtail gratuitous transfers at 
death.182  In addition, inter vivos transfers can be socially suboptimal 
because of what Hendrik Hartog has called the “King Lear” problem—“the 
problem of not giving up control and power and property too early.”183 
 
 178. See, e.g., Richard I. Kirkland, Jr., Should You Leave It All to the Children?, 
FORTUNE, Sept. 29, 1986, at 18 (interviewing Warren Buffett, who stated that “the perfect 
amount to leave to children is ‘enough money so that they would feel they could do 
anything, but not so much that they could do nothing’”); see also DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, 
supra note 90, at 9–10 (pointing out that settlors often rely on “incentive trusts” to ensure a 
“beneficiary does not adopt a slothful or frivolous lifestyle”). 
 179. See POSNER, supra note 19, at 688 (“[H]eavy estate taxation, by raising the price of 
posthumous consumption relative to present consumption, will reduce the incentive to save 
and increase the incentive to consume.”); see also McCaffery, supra note 171, at 318–21. 
 180. See supra notes 174–76 and accompanying text. 
 181. SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 66; see also Hirsch, supra note 49, at 51 (“[D]enying 
freedom of testation in the statute books would not curtail it in action (absent very costly 
policing), for testators could avail themselves of roundabout, or if need be surreptitious, 
expedients to reach the same result.”). 
 182. See WILLIAM GODWIN, ENQUIRY CONCERNING POLITICAL JUSTICE 718–19 (Isaac 
Kramnick ed., Penguin 1985) (1793); Hirsch & Wang, supra note 28, at 11. 
 183. HENDRIK HARTOG, SOMEDAY ALL THIS WILL BE YOURS:  A HISTORY OF INHERITANCE 
AND OLD AGE 33 (2012) (emphasis added).  Near the beginning of King Lear, Lear foolishly 
disposes of his estate by giving away property to two of his three daughters, even though he 
is still alive. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR act 1, sc. 1. 
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Second, the ex ante perspective recognizes that the law may affect the 
identity of donees.  If a donor believes that a court is unlikely to effectuate 
gifts to certain donees or certain types of donees,184 the donor may choose 
to give her property to others at the outset.  Suppose a donor executes a will 
that contains a conditional bequest to a child and a gift over to a charity.  If 
the donor anticipates a court will not enforce the condition in the bequest, 
the donor may just provide an outright gift to the charity, eliminating any 
possibility of the child’s satisfying the condition and receiving the bequest. 
Likewise, a donor may alter the size of a gift.  Suppose a donor wishes to 
give a charity $2 million from her estate, but the donor believes a court will 
allow the charity to allege “changed circumstances” too easily and alter the 
distributional provisions through cy pres.  Anticipating this possibility, the 
donor may give the charity only $500,000, rather than $2 million, from her 
estate.  Once again, a donor may alter her behavior or the size of her gifts 
not only in wills but also in trusts:  “Individuals who know that their intent 
cannot be carried out in a trust may behave differently” because “they may 
choose to alter the plan of their trust and leave their property to different 
individuals or entities or to vary the amount left to each beneficiary.”185 
Third, the ex ante view recognizes that, in response to a restriction on 
testamentary freedom, a donor may limit gratuitous transfers at death or 
forgo such gifts entirely.  Posner mentions the possibility that “in the long 
term, as testators ‘wise up’ to the courts’ policy of refusing to enforce 
conditions that the judges deem unreasonable, they will curtail bequests.”186  
Similarly, Hirsch notes that allowing trustees “to deviate at their discretion 
from any charitable purpose immediately upon creation of the trust” could  
“prompt the testator ex ante to refrain from making charitable bequests.”187  
Thus, if the law disregards donative intent, donors may alter their behavior 
and choose to curtail bequests or forgo giving altogether. 
Historically, in attempting to dismiss this possibility, some jurists have 
argued that even if courts interfere with the freedom of testation and 
disregard donative intent, donors will continue to give and will give in the 
same way.  In The Dead Hand, Arthur Hobhouse concludes:  “Another plea 
for non-interference is that many people will cease to give if they see the 
gifts of others freely remodelled.”188  Hobhouse opines:  “This plea appears 
to me to rest on no evidence and no probability, and even if it did, it would 
not be valid.”189 
As Hobhouse suggests, whether and to what extent intervention through 
succession law affects the structure and timing of gifts is an empirical 
question.  Currently, except in estate and gift taxation, there is little 
 
 184. See generally Leslie, supra note 12, at 236 (“Notwithstanding frequent declarations 
to the contrary, many courts are as committed to ensuring that testators devise their estates in 
accordance with prevailing normative views as they are to effectuating testamentary 
intent.”). 
 185. Tate, supra note 168, at 479. 
 186. POSNER, supra note 19, at 700. 
 187. Hirsch, supra note 49, at 89 n.203 (emphasis added). 
 188. ARTHUR HOBHOUSE, THE DEAD HAND 224 (London, Chatto & Windus 1880). 
 189. Id. at 225. 
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empirical work investigating the effects of legal rules on the timing and 
structure of gifts.190  However, for the theoretical reasons noted above, 
courts and commentators should consider the possibility that the law may 
have an impact on the donor’s incentives. 
4.  Other Ex Ante Considerations 
This section explores several other factors that are often overlooked from 
an ex post perspective.  These factors include both reliance and rent seeking 
by potential donees; the incentives of fiduciaries, attorneys, and other estate 
planning professionals; the probability that donees or potential donees may 
contest a will or trust; and the magnitude of litigation costs if parties change 
their behavior in response to the legal rule. 
First, altering a gratuitous transfer at death may affect other potential 
donees.  A family member who is disinherited or a donee who receives less 
than what the donee expected may suffer disutility based on the disposition 
itself.  For example, a child who expects to receive a significant bequest 
from a parent or to receive an equal share of the parent’s estate may suffer 
disappointment if the parent intentionally disinherits the child or provides 
less than an equal share of the estate.191  Moreover, a donee (and the donor) 
may benefit if the donee is able to engage in ex ante reliance on the donor’s 
bequest.192  Restricting a donor’s ability to make a binding promise to the 
donee may affect the donee’s ex ante behavior and reduce social welfare.193 
Second, donees may engage in rent-seeking behavior.194  Frequently, 
potential donees will have a private incentive to take actions to increase 
their share of the decedent’s estate.195  But many of these actions are 
socially wasteful.196  For example, donees may attempt to convince the 
 
 190. See, e.g., B. Douglas Bernheim et al., Do Estate and Gift Taxes Affect the Timing of 
Private Transfers?, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 2617, 2617 (2004) (“[H]ouseholds experiencing larger 
declines in the expected tax disadvantages of bequests reduced inter vivos transfers relative 
to households experiencing small declines in the tax disadvantages of bequests.”). 
 191. See Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, Religiously Inspired Gender-Bias Disinheritance—
What’s Law Got To Do with It?, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 669, 670 (2010) (“[D]isinheritance 
can disappoint and anger the child, stimulating feelings of rejection.” (citing B. Douglas 
Bernheim & Sergei Severinov, Bequests As Signals:  An Explanation for the Equal Division 
Puzzle, 111 J. POL. ECON. 733 (2003))). 
 192. See Shavell, supra note 157, at 402 (“Before a donee receives a gift, he may take 
actions that will increase its value . . . .  For example, the nephew may study in preparation 
for college; this will make a gift of a college education more useful for him.”); see also 
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises:  An Examination of the Basis of 
Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1276–83 (1980) (discussing the donee’s reliance interest). 
 193. See Shavell, supra note 157, at 419–20 (offering a formal model of deferred giving 
and altruism and concluding that “donors should be able to bind themselves to give gifts” 
because donors may want “to distinguish themselves from masqueraders and thereby to 
induce donees to rely, enhancing the value of gifts” to both donors and donees). 
 194. On rent-seeking behavior in the context of succession, see James M. Buchanan, Rent 
Seeking, Noncompensated Transfers, and Laws of Succession, 26 J.L. & ECON. 71 (1983). 
 195. See id. at 74. 
 196. See id. at 74–75; Hirsch & Wang, supra note 28, at 10; see also Mark L. Ascher, 
Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69, 108 (1990) (“When potential donees and 
legatees compete for the favor of a donor or testator, they engage in activity that creates no 
new wealth. They expend resources over the allocation of wealth already in existence.”).  
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donor to increase their allocation of the estate or decrease the shares of 
others.  Some donees also may attempt to persuade a donor to revoke (or 
not to revoke) an existing will or to execute a new will if doing so will 
change a disposition in their favor.197  Donees may lobby the legislature to 
enact (or not to enact) certain laws that may favor (or disfavor) their 
interests.198  They also may file lawsuits challenging the validity of a will or 
trust or the interpretation of its distributional provisions, in the hope of 
extracting a settlement from the estate.199  Such activities are socially 
wasteful insofar as potential donees would not have undertaken them but 
for the possibility of increasing their share of the estate.200 
Third, the law may affect the incentives of fiduciaries (such as executors 
and trustees), attorneys, and other estate planning professionals.  For 
example, in investing trust assets, trustees had different incentives under the 
traditional prudent man rule (where courts often exhibited hindsight bias) 
than under the modern prudent investor rule.201  Ex ante analysis also 
considers the incentives of attorneys and estate planning professionals who 
assist in preparing, drafting, executing, and administering wills and trusts.  
The level of care these professionals exercise may depend to a certain 
extent on the applicable legal rule.  For example, an attorney that is drafting 
a will may exercise optimal care if the attorney knows that he or she is 
responsible, financially as well as professionally, for any mistake.202  The 
attorney may exercise less care if the attorney recognizes that liability for 
malpractice is unlikely and that, even if there is an error, a court is likely to 
reform the will rather than impose malpractice liability.203  Of course, 
attorneys have other motivations, including their professional reputations, 
that provide incentives for exercising due care as well.204 
 
Pure rent seeking should be distinguished from an exchange in which a person provides care 
for elderly parents or others in anticipation of a gift from the estate, an exchange that may be 
welfare enhancing. See supra notes 62–64, 155 and accompanying text. 
 197. It is worth noting that the possibility of rent-seeking behavior is one argument 
against adopting a system of testamentary freedom in which a donor has considerable 
discretion in choosing beneficiaries. See Buchanan, supra note 194, at 78. 
 198. See ROBERT D. TOLLISON, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF RENT SEEKING (1995); Fred 
S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 
J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1987). 
 199. See John H. Langbein, Living Probate:  The Conservatorship Model, 77 MICH. L. 
REV. 63, 66 (1978) (stating that most litigation over capacity “is directed towards provoking 
pretrial settlements” and “the odor of the strike suit hangs heavily over this field”); see also 
Daniel B. Kelly, Strategic Spillovers, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1685–86 & n.200 (2011). 
 200. See, e.g., Buchanan, supra note 194, at 78 (“[I]nvestment in litigation . . . reflects 
socially wasteful rent seeking, even if it is now directed toward a different object from that 
which occurs when discretionary power remains with the potential donor of transfers.”). 
 201. See supra Part II.B. 
 202. Cf. Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 592 
(1988) (“Judicial punctiliousness about establishing and following clear rules, one would 
suppose, can influence behavior in the direction of greater productivity or carefulness.”). 
 203. See Champine, supra note 48, at 439–40. 
 204. See Leandra Lederman & Warren B. Hrung, Do Attorneys Do Their Clients Justice?  
An Empirical Study of Lawyers’ Effects on Tax Court Litigation Outcomes, 41 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 1235, 1241–42 (2006); cf. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The 
Uneasy Case for Product Liability, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1440 (2010) (arguing that firms 
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Fourth, the ex ante view recognizes that the probability of litigation and 
magnitude of litigation costs are likely to vary depending on the legal rule.  
The likelihood of litigation may depend on how a legal rule affects the 
donor’s incentives to structure a gift and the donees’ incentives to contest a 
will or trust.  It also may depend on how much uncertainty or 
unpredictability a rule creates.  Likewise, the magnitude of litigation costs 
depends on several factors, including the extent to which the donor or 
donor’s estate can anticipate and avoid litigation, donees may use litigation 
(or its threat) to advance their interests, and courts may invest time and 
effort in correcting errors.  Litigation costs also depend on the clarity of will 
and trust provisions, which themselves may depend on the probability of 
legal intervention and the size of an estate.  Thus, different legal rules will 
create different incentives to litigate and various levels of litigation costs. 
*  *  * 
Overall, the ex ante perspective is superior to the ex post perspective 
because it incorporates the effects of legal rules on incentives and avoids 
the trap of hindsight bias.  In succession law, there are a number of ex ante 
considerations that courts and commentators often overlook, including a 
donor’s happiness, a donor’s incentive to accumulate property, and the 
structure and timing of gifts.  If donors believe that courts may not facilitate 
their intent, donors may not only be less happy and consume more during 
life, but also may alter, restrict, or forgo their gifts at death.  Adopting an ex 
ante perspective does not provide a definitive answer about whether a legal 
rule or policy that restricts testamentary freedom is socially desirable or 
socially undesirable.205  But evaluating a legal rule or policy from an ex 
post perspective is incomplete and potentially misleading.  Given the 
 
may have an “incentive to make safe products even in the absence of product liability” 
because of market forces such as reputation). 
 205. While pointing out the importance of incorporating ex ante analysis in evaluating 
restrictions on testamentary freedom, this Article has not discussed the social desirability of 
such restrictions.  For example, in response to a rule prohibiting a certain type of conditional 
bequest, a donor may decide to forego the donative transfer.  But whether or not this change 
in the donor’s actions is socially desirable depends on the condition itself and the policy 
reason underlying its prohibition.   For example, a trust delaying postponement of a gift until 
the beneficiary turns twenty-one (which most courts would uphold) is different from a 
conditional bequest that contains a restriction on marriage (which depends on the court and 
the circumstances), which differs from a racially discriminatory provision in a will or trust 
(if the discrimination is invidious, courts will invalidate the discriminatory provision, 
terminate the trust, or apply cy pres to reform a charitable trust).  In each case, effectuating 
or not effectuating the condition may affect the donor’s ex ante actions, but the question of 
whether intervention is socially desirable is a distinct, albeit related, issue. 
  In addition, it is worth noting that the ex ante approach is not coextensive with the 
donor’s ex ante interests.  As noted above, in some instances, effectuating a donor’s interests 
may conflict with maximizing social welfare, i.e., restricting testamentary freedom may 
decrease the donor’s utility, but the decrease might be outweighed by an increase in the 
donee’s utility. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.  Typically, however, the legal 
system does not have enough information to second guess the donor’s disposition and raise 
social welfare.  Moreover, even when society believes that it can make such a judgment ex 
post, the ex ante consequences (e.g., on the donor’s incentive to accumulate property or the 
structure and timing of the donor’s gift) may militate in favor of effectuating donative intent. 
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importance of ex ante considerations, the next section investigates the social 
desirability of various justifications for restricting testamentary freedom. 
III.  JUSTIFICATIONS FOR RESTRICTING TESTAMENTARY FREEDOM 
While effectuating donative intent is typically consistent with 
maximizing social welfare, there are several reasons why a donor’s express 
wishes may diverge from what is socially desirable:  imperfect information, 
negative externalities, and intergenerational equity.  This Article contends 
that, at least theoretically, each of these reasons may provide a justification 
for restricting testamentary freedom.  This Article then examines two other 
reasons why courts may disregard a donor’s intent:  maximizing the donees’ 
ex post interests and discounting the donor’s preferences.  It contends that, 
from an ex ante perspective, these justifications are problematic. 
A.  Legitimate Justifications (in Theory) 
From an economic perspective, there are several theoretical reasons why 
effectuating the donor’s express wishes may diverge from what is socially 
optimal, including (1) imperfect information, (2) negative externalities, and 
(3) intergenerational equity.206 
1.  Imperfect Information 
One reason why effectuating donative intent is not necessarily consistent 
with maximizing social welfare is imperfect information.  Future events are 
difficult to foresee and unanticipated contingencies may arise.  As a result, a 
donor may dispose of property in a way that contradicts what the donor 
would have wanted with complete information.  Moreover, even if 
foreseeable, each contingency is costly to specify.  Consequently, a donor 
may not explicitly provide for the disposition of property under all possible 
circumstances.  In either case, an unforeseen or unprovided-for 
contingency, judicial intervention may be necessary to carry out the donor’s 
probable intent, i.e., the donor’s true plans under perfect information.207 
 
 206. In surveying “[v]alid arguments against dead hand control of property,” Shavell 
mentions “the cost and impracticality of making highly refined arrangements for dead hand 
control,” “harmful external effects,” and “inherent inequality in the wealth of the present 
generation versus that of future generations.” SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 70–71.  I examine 
each of these justifications in greater detail.  Analyzing the legitimate, as well as illegitimate, 
justifications for restricting testamentary freedom is important not only for analytical clarity 
but also because many members of the public are unable to articulate why the law should 
restrict, or not restrict, a person’s distribution of property at death. See Mary Louise Fellows 
et al., Public Attitudes About Property Distribution at Death and Intestate Succession Laws 
in the United States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 319, 336 (“When respondents were asked 
the general question concerning freedom of testamentary disposition, 89 percent thought 
there should be no restrictions.  When asked to explain, the respondents merely repeated 
their beliefs that a person should not be restricted in choosing a distributive plan.”). 
 207. See SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 70 (“If . . . the plans that are made for the control of 
property after death are not reflective of the true detailed plans that would have been made if 
the individuals had the time and ability to consider all possibilities, the state’s modification 
of their plans may sometimes be justified as an attempt to carry out their true plans.”); cf. 
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To amplify, because future events are difficult to predict, “many kinds of 
future outcomes would not even be contemplated by a person when making 
provisions for the control of property.”208  While a person is alive, one 
“reason why a person may modify a will is simply that the writer did not 
include a contingency in the will because, at the time the will was written, 
the contingency was unlikely or not even contemplated.”209  However, after 
death, it is impossible for the donor to modify a disposition on account of 
an unforeseen event or unanticipated contingency.210 
Given that such “recontracting” is infeasible,211 judicial intervention may 
enhance social welfare if a court modifies or interprets a will or trust 
consistent with the donor’s probable intent.212  If interpretation or 
modification of the donative document were not permitted, then a transfer 
pursuant to the donor’s express wishes might be socially undesirable.213  
The court’s objective should be to determine the donor’s probable intent, 
assuming the donor had foreseen all relevant circumstances and events.214  
As a result, intervening to maximize social welfare is not inconsistent with 
the donor’s true intent. 
Second, even if a donor is able to foresee future contingencies, it may not 
be rational for the donor to provide for each particular contingency in the 
will or trust.  In contract law, Oliver Hart, Oliver Williamson, and others 
have pointed out that parties may omit terms to save time, money, and 
effort because “many eventualities are hard to anticipate or describe in 
advance” and “writing contracts involves costs that rise with the number of 
contractual terms.”215  In highlighting a similar phenomenon in the context 
of gifts at death, Shavell points out that it would often be irrational for 
individuals to “make highly detailed plans for the control of property after 
 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:  WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.2 cmt. b 
(2003) (“The rationale for modifying a donative document is that the donor would have 
desired the modification to be made if he or she had realized that the desired tax objectives 
would not be achieved.”).  One type of unforeseen or unprovided-for contingency that might 
alter the donor’s disposition is a change in the applicable law (including, perhaps, a change 
in a legal rule favoring the ex post perspective). 
 208. SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 70. 
 209. Id. at 64. 
 210. POSNER, supra note 19, at 699 (suggesting courts should have the ability to modify 
testamentary gifts because there is no possibility of “recontracting” once the donor is dead 
and arguing for a “cy pres approach in private as well as charitable trust cases”). 
 211. Id. 
 212. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412, 7C U.L.A. 507 (2010); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TRUSTS § 66(1) (2003). 
 213. See POSNER, supra note 19, at 695. 
 214. Cf. id. at 696 (“[T]he dilemma of whether to enforce the testator’s intent or to 
modify the terms of the will in accordance with changed conditions since his death is often a 
false one.  A policy of rigid adherence to the letter of the donative instrument is likely to 
frustrate both the donor’s purposes and the efficient use of resources.”). 
 215. Shavell, supra note 16, at 289–90; see also OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC 
INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM:  FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985); Oliver 
Hart & John Moore, Foundations of Incomplete Contracts, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 115 (1999); 
Oliver Hart & Bengt Holmstrӧm, The Theory of Contracts, in ADVANCES IN ECONOMIC 
THEORY 71 (1987); Jean Tirole, Incomplete Contracts:  Where Do We Stand?, 67 
ECONOMETRICA 741 (1999). 
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death.”216  The reason is that “the cost of making a detailed provision is 
borne with certainty, whereas the benefit is discounted by the often 
extremely small likelihood of the occurrence of a contingency and perhaps 
by its remoteness in time.”217  Once again, a court’s intervening to address 
a circumstance that a donor did not address explicitly may be consistent 
with the donor’s probable intent and enhance social welfare.218 
Thus, like contracts, gratuitous transfers at death entail the problem of 
imperfect information.  Donors are incapable of anticipating all future 
contingencies and, even if they could, it would not be cost-effective to 
specify each contingency in a will or trust.  Unlike contracts, the devisees of 
a will or the beneficiaries of a trust can no longer negotiate with the testator 
or settlor once he or she is dead if circumstances change or new information 
emerges.219  Hence, judicial intervention to modify or interpret the terms of 
a gift may be desirable in certain situations, and such intervention may be 
consistent with the donor’s probable intent.220  Of course, because courts 
also lack perfect information, judicial intervention to modify or interpret the 
 
 216. SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 70. 
 217. Id. 
 218. In addition, several cognitive limitations, tangentially related to imperfect 
information, may justify restrictions on testamentary freedom.  The UPC requires a testator 
to be “18 or more years of age.” UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-501, 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 144 (2010).  
Conversely, a court sometimes employs a more searching inquiry if a testator is elderly or 
exhibits signs of senility. Cf. SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 66 (“The donor’s inability to make 
a sound decision might also be suggested as a rationale for state control of bequests; in the 
late stages of life, an individual’s judgment is often impaired.”).  If a person is insane, a 
court will not probate the person’s will because a testator must be of “sound mind.” UNIF. 
PROBATE CODE § 2-501, 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 144; see also DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 
90, at 266 (discussing reasons for the requirement of mental capacity).  A court also may not 
effectuate a donor’s wishes if the donor was under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the 
time of executing a will, though evidence of addiction does not negate testamentary capacity. 
See Pamela Champine, Expertise and Instinct in the Assessment of Testamentary Capacity, 
51 VILL. L. REV. 25, 36 (2006) (noting that the “standard doctrine” is that addiction “does 
not preclude the existence of testamentary capacity” (citing In re Herman, 734 N.Y.S.2d 194 
(App. Div. 2001); In re Sechrest, 537 S.E.2d 511 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000))).  Likewise, 
situations involving defects in testamentary capacity due to undue influence or coercion are 
cases in which not effectuating wills or trusts as written is clearly beneficial.  In each 
situation—minority, senility, insanity, intoxication, and undue influence or coercion—the 
objective of intervening is not to effectuate the donor’s express wishes.  Rather, the aim is to 
provide a disposition that most closely approximates the donor’s probable intent. 
 219. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. i (2003) (noting that “the ‘rigor 
mortis’ of deadhand control is not present while a property owner is able to respond to 
persuasion and evolving circumstances”); see also POSNER, supra note 19, at 696 (“[T]here 
is a stronger case for paternalism in the case of wills than in the case of contracts.  Contracts 
can be modified, but a person cannot modify the terms of his will after he’s dead.”). 
 220. The objective would be to determine a donor’s probable intent, i.e., the donor’s true 
intent with perfect information.  Thus, legal intervention because of imperfect information, 
including but not limited to changed circumstances, is not restricting testamentary freedom, 
but facilitating it. Cf. POSNER, supra note 19, at 696 (“[A] rational donor knows that his 
intentions might eventually be thwarted by unpredictable circumstances and may therefore 
be presumed to accept implicitly a rule permitting modification of the terms of the bequest in 
the event that an unforeseen change frustrates his original intention.”). 
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terms of a will or trust has significant costs as well, including error costs 
and decision costs.221 
2.  Negative Externalities 
Even if a donor had perfect information, there might still be a legitimate 
justification for legal intervention.  Specifically, if the donor’s disposition 
entails external costs or “externalities,” then effectuating donative intent 
might be inconsistent with maximizing social welfare.222  Owners often 
impose harm on others by using their property (e.g., pollution from a 
factory).  Externalities also may arise because of a disposition of property at 
death.223  The problem is that an owner (here, the donor) may have an 
incentive to undertake an activity (in this case, a gift at death) if the 
“activity’s private benefits exceed its private costs even though, as a result 
of the externality, the activity is undesirable as its social costs exceed its 
social benefits.”224 
Consider the disinheritance of minor children.225  Hirsch notes that “one 
potential justification for compulsory bequests to children is spillover costs, 
which could arise with regard to minor or disabled children who are unable 
to fend for themselves.”226  Likewise, Shavell explains that a “dependent 
child who does not inherit wealth may receive public support,” and that, as 
a result, a “person might reduce or exclude his or her allocation to . . . 
children, depending on public support to take up the slack.”227  However, 
 
 221. For this reason, whether a court should intervene depends not only on the donor’s 
information but also the court’s information, as well as the administrative and litigation costs 
of attempting to discern the donor’s probable intent.  In theory, if a donor is skeptical about 
the possibility of judicial intervention, the donor might insert a “no modification clause” or 
another provision specifying either the circumstances in which the court can intervene or the 
method of interpretation.  That is, some donors may affirmatively choose not to have the 
court update their donative documents or not to investigate their probable intent, even in 
cases involving imperfect information. Cf. id. (“Some rational donors, mistrustful of judges’ 
ability to alter the terms of a bequest intelligently in light of changed conditions, might 
prefer to assume the risks involved in rigid adherence to the original terms.”). 
 222. For an overview of the externalities problem, see SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 77–
109. 
 223. See id. at 65, 71. 
 224. Kelly, supra note 199, at 1644, 1649–51 (summarizing the problem with negative 
externalities). 
 225. Suppose Joe has two minor children and assets valued at $4 million.  Instead of 
devising $4 million in equal shares to his children or providing $2 million to each child in 
trust, Joe decides to give all of his property to a favorite charity, thus disinheriting his 
children.  Joe dies, the executor of Joe’s estate distributes his assets according to Joe’s 
wishes, and Joe’s children, both of whom are minors, are left penniless.  Joe’s children will 
continue to need financial support for food, shelter, education, and health care.  The 
government, a religious or charitable organization, or a family member must now step in to 
provide this support.  As a result, Joe’s decision to disinherit his children has external effects 
on others who must pay for their care. 
 226. Hirsch, supra note 29, at 2236; see also Brashier, supra note 9, at 3 (“When the 
disinherited child is a minor, unable to provide for himself, society often must bear the cost 
of the parent’s disinheriting act.”). 
 227. SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 65; cf. Horton, supra note 143, at 1703 (noting that 
“trusts can create externalities by excluding certain individuals,” including dependents). 
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despite this potential externality, the UPC and almost every state (except 
Louisiana) permit parents to disinherit their minor children.228 
While generally permitting the intentional disinheritance of children, 
American succession law does restrict the freedom of testation in other 
situations involving externalities.  For example, a court will not enforce a 
devise encouraging an illegal activity that is socially undesirable.  If a donor 
attempts to devise $1 million to a person in a murder-for-hire scheme, 
effectuating the donor’s intent would be socially undesirable.229  Similarly, 
in addition to being illegal under the Equal Protection Clause and federal 
and state antidiscrimination laws,230 a racial restriction in a will is contrary 
to public policy because such a restriction imposes harm on others, 
including the victims of discrimination, other individuals within the 
targeted group, and society in general.231  In addition, even if an activity is 
legal, a court may refrain from enforcing a devise on the basis of public 
policy if the devise entails a significant externality.  For example, although 
disrupting family relationships is often legal, a will provision that attempts 
to encourage divorce or separation is unenforceable.232 
Moreover, one major justification for spousal rights, such as the UPC’s 
elective share,233 is a concern that disinheritance may impose harm on 
others.  In addition to the harm on the surviving spouse, a concern is that 
the donor, knowing “a spouse . . . who does not inherit wealth may receive 
public support,” may decide to “reduce or exclude his or her allocation to a 
spouse” and that, consequently, “[t]his externality might justify a stipulation 
that some minimum fraction of property be given to spouses.”234 
 
 228. See Brashier, supra note 9; see also Vincent Rougeau, No Bonds but Those Freely 
Chosen:  An Obituary for the Principle of Forced Heirship in American Law, 1 CIV. L. 
COMMENT. 3 (2008) (exploring the history of forced heirship in Louisiana).  The existence or 
magnitude of an externality may depend to a certain extent on the sensibilities of individuals 
within a particular culture.  For example, in some countries, property is viewed more in 
terms of families than individuals; filial piety plays a central role; and filial disinheritance is 
extremely uncommon. See, e.g., Ya-Hui Hsu, Should China Adopt Taiwan’s Mandatory 
Share Doctrine?, 29 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 289, 325–30 (2010) (“Taiwan’s mandatory 
share doctrine is a product of the Chinese culture and tradition.”). 
 229. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:  WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS 
§ 10.1 cmt. c (2003) (“Among the rules of law that prohibit or restrict freedom of disposition 
in certain instances are . . . provisions encouraging illegal activity . . . .”). 
 230. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 90, at 766–68. 
 231. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:  WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS 
§ 10.1 cmt. c; see also SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 71 (noting that restrictions on the use of 
property based on race or religion involve harmful external effects because they may 
“increase feelings of separateness in the population at large and generally contribute to social 
friction”). 
 232. See, e.g., In re Estate of Owen, 855 N.E.2d 603, 611 (Ind. App. 2006) (“[A] 
condition to devise by will, the tendency of which is to encourage divorce or bring about a 
separation of husband and wife, is against public policy and void.”). 
 233. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. II, pt. 2, 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 93–268 (2010). 
 234. SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 65.  Posner posits a transaction costs justification for the 
elective share. See POSNER, supra note 19, at 701.  On the role of transaction costs in 
succession, see Kelly supra note 29, at 864–67. 
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Likewise, the UPC protects the rights of the decedent’s creditors.235 The 
nonpayment of a decedent’s debts, including the ability to circumvent 
creditors at death, would impose harm on others and increase the costs of 
financing during life.236  Finally, the law restricts testamentary freedom in 
several situations involving externalities that are relatively diffuse.  These 
restrictions include the rule against perpetuities,237 the rule against 
accumulations of income,238 and the estate tax.239 
3.  Intergenerational Equity 
A third theoretical justification for restricting testamentary freedom is 
intergenerational equity between the interests of the present generation and 
future generations.  Those who are now living may have incentives to use 
and dispose of property in ways that benefit their own interests.  However, 
the living may not have an incentive to incorporate fully the interests of 
future generations.  Thus, their incentive to use and transfer property may 
diverge from what is socially optimal.240 
Kaplow and Shavell have each put forward a version of this argument in 
two separate contexts.  In discussing a rationale for subsidizing gifts, 
Kaplow argues that there may be too little giving because donors do not 
have an incentive to incorporate the full value of their gifts to their donees.  
The level of gift giving may be suboptimal because, although donors may 
obtain an altruistic benefit from the effect of their gifts on the utility of their 
donees, they do not take into account that the benefit to the donees is itself 
 
 235. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 3-801 to -816, 8 U.L.A. pt. II, at 208–66. 
 236. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 90, at 44 (describing one of probate’s “core 
functions” as “protect[ing] creditors by providing a procedure for payment of the decedent’s 
debts” (emphasis omitted)); John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of 
the Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108, 1120–25 (1984) (discussing creditor 
protection under probate and nonprobate transfers); see also UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. III, pt. 
8 general comment, 8 U.L.A. pt. II, at 208 (“Commercial and consumer credit depends upon 
efficient collection procedures.”). 
 237. See Stewart E. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition To Abolish the Rule Against 
Perpetuities:  R.I.P. for the R.A.P., 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2097, 2117 (2003) (“Without the 
Rule, or some substitute, settlors are likely to create trusts that generate agency costs and 
externalities without generating commensurate benefits.”). But cf. Richard A. Epstein, Past 
and Future:  The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 667, 705 
(1986) (“The rule against perpetuities and its kindred rules are not directed toward any kind 
of externality.”). 
 238. Cf. Robert H. Sitkoff, The Lurking Rule Against Accumulations of Income, 100 NW. 
U. L. REV. 501, 513–16 (2008) (discussing justifications for rule against accumulations in 
income and concluding that the “shift in the nature of wealth from land to financial assets 
and the revolution in trust investment law, taken together, render obsolete the concern over 
economic distortions stemming from accumulations in trust”). 
 239. See POSNER, supra note 19, at 570 (“Estate taxation might . . . seem necessary to 
prevent the creation over time of huge fortunes that might stimulate political unrest.”); 
SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 65 (“One might say that allowing families to retain large 
amounts of wealth detracts from social cohesion because it allows elites to sustain 
themselves.”). 
 240. Given that the present generation may not have a private incentive to incorporate 
fully the social costs (or benefits) of their actions on future generations, the argument based 
on intergenerational equity is a variation of the argument based on negative (or positive) 
externalities. 
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relevant to social welfare.241  For example, suppose an altruistic person is 
deciding whether to consume her property or give it away.  Consuming the 
property increases the person’s utility by $75.  Giving the property away 
increases her utility by $1 for every $1 increase in the donee’s utility.  If the 
donee values the gift at $50, the donor will have a private incentive to 
consume the property ($75 > $50), even though a gift is socially desirable 
($75 < $100).  Thus, due to this positive externality, donative transfers, 
including gifts at death, may diverge from what is socially desirable. 
Shavell makes an argument with similar economic logic but applies it 
explicitly in the context of tradeoffs between the present generation and 
future generations.  He argues, “By virtue of its priority in time, the present 
generation owns the whole of the earth and all the things on it.”242  As a 
result, “the present generation has a greater ability to control property than 
is socially desirable, presuming that the measure of social welfare accords 
substantial weight to future generations.”243  For example, suppose the 
world consists of two generations, and the utility of individuals in each 
generation depends on their consumption of an exhaustible resource, oil.  
Each member of the present generation, Generation 1, consumes 900 units 
of oil.  Each member of the future generation, Generation 2, then consumes 
what is left, 100 units of oil.  Assuming a diminishing marginal utility of oil 
(and ignoring the issue of intertemporal discounting), shifting oil from 
Generation 1 to Generation 2 would raise total utility.  Of course, given its 
priority in time, Generation 1 can exercise control over property, not only 
by consuming it during life, but also by controlling it after death.  
Therefore, Shavell suggests that “in order preserve intergenerational equity, 
limiting the ability of the present generation to control property after their 
death may be socially warranted.”244 
Although the present generation may have an incentive to give too little 
or consume too much, the inquiry is complicated by several factors.  The 
idea of intergenerational equity is based on the premise of treating the 
present generation and future generations equally from the perspective of 
social utility.  However, future generations may benefit from advances in 
technology and investments in infrastructure made by the present 
generation.245  For example, as a result of scientific and technological 
innovation, future generations may experience fewer diseases, less hunger, 
and less misery.  If so, future generations might be better off than the 
present one, meaning there would be less of a need for the law to restrict 
 
 241. Kaplow, A Note on Subsidizing Gifts, supra note 5, at 469–77. 
 242. SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 71. 
 243. Id.  Shavell notes that “those alive today might care very little about the well-being 
of individuals ten generations in the future, but a social welfare measure might accord 
similar weight to the well-being of individuals ten generations in the future as it does to the 
well-being of the present generation.” Id. at 71 n.74. 
 244. Id. at 71. 
 245. Moreover, depending on the applicable discount rate, investing now in research and 
technology may bestow greater benefits on future generations than directly transferring 
property across generations. 
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testamentary freedom to preserve assets for the future.246  Therefore, it is 
unclear whether such intervention is theoretically necessary or desirable 
(even assuming it would be practical).  In any event, it does not appear that 
the legal system usually relies on this justification, except in certain limited 
contexts in environmental law, such as protecting endangered species,247 
and intellectual property, such as preserving the public domain.248 
B.  Illegitimate Justifications 
In addition to imperfect information, negative externalities, and 
intergenerational equity, are there other justifications for limiting a donor’s 
freedom of testation?  This section explores two additional justifications for 
legal intervention:  (1) maximizing the ex post interests of donees, which is 
increasingly common; and (2) discounting the idiosyncratic preferences of 
donors, which is interesting but relatively rare.  From an economic view, 
both of these justifications are illegitimate. 
1.  Ex Post Interests of Donees 
An increasingly common justification for restricting testamentary 
freedom is that doing so is necessary to promote the interests of the donees.  
In certain ways, including the creation of perpetual trusts, donors have 
attempted to extend the dead hand further than ever before.  Yet, on 
numerous issues, from conditional bequests to modification of trusts, law 
reformers and courts are increasingly privileging the interests of the donees, 
even if doing so is inconsistent with the intent of the donor. 
Several other commentators have noted this development.  For example, 
in The New Direction of American Trust Law, Thomas Gallanis argues that 
“American trust law, after decades of favoring the settlor, is moving in a 
new direction, with a reassertion of the interests and rights of the 
beneficiaries.”249  Gallanis contends the “modern approach” to doctrines 
like spendthrift protection, administrative deviation, and trust modification 
illustrates that the pendulum is swinging from a “pro-settlor direction” 
toward the beneficiaries as “trust law balances the desires of the settlor with 
the property rights of the trust’s beneficiaries.”250  Similarly, in discussing 
“the larger context of legal reform affecting the scope of dead hand 
 
 246. See POSNER, supra note 19, at 689 (“In general, every generation is wealthier than 
the one before, and this appears to be due far more to increases in knowledge than to deferral 
of consumption by the previous generation.”).  On the other hand, there is also the possibility 
that future people will be worse off, suffering from more war, disease, or natural disasters.  If 
so, intervention may theoretically be needed to prevent the present generation from giving 
too little to future generations. 
 247. See, e.g., Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006); see also Cass R. 
Sunstein & Arden Rowell, On Discounting Regulatory Benefits:  Risk, Money, and 
Intergenerational Equity, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 171, 188–207 (2007) (discussing the problem of 
intergenerational equity). 
 248. See generally Symposium, Intergenerational Equity and Intellectual Property, 2011 
WIS. L. REV. 103. 
 249. Gallanis, supra note 12, at 216. 
 250. Id. at 237. 
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control,” Reid Weisbord observes “a retreat away from dead hand control in 
the broader law of trusts . . . [, which] has undergone reforms that provide 
greater protection for beneficiaries.”251  Weisbord argues that this “modern 
trend in trust law embodies features that tend to weaken the settlor’s ability 
to exercise perpetual control over property held in trust.”252 
To be sure, there is a long tradition within Anglo-American jurisprudence 
and political philosophy that suggests that the wishes of the dead should not 
trump the interests of the living.  In the late eighteenth century, Thomas 
Jefferson thought it “self-evident” that “the earth belongs in usufruct to the 
living; that the dead have neither powers nor rights over it.”253  Likewise, 
William Godwin asserted that it would be “the most extravagant fiction, 
which would enlarge the empire of the proprietor beyond his natural 
existence, and enable him to dispose of events, when he is himself no 
longer in the world.”254  Almost a century later, Hobhouse declared: 
What I consider to be not conjectural, but proved by experience in all 
human affairs, is, that people are the best judges of their own concerns; or 
if they are not, that it is better for them, on moral grounds, that they 
should manage their own concerns for themselves, and that it cannot be 
wrong continually to claim this liberty for every Generation of mortal 
men.255 
The U.S. Supreme Court, noting that the legislature could “abolish the 
power of testamentary disposition over property,” has emphasized that “the 
dead hand rules succession only by sufferance.”256  Thus, in addition to 
recent developments in law reform, there is a long tradition that suggests 
that the wishes of the dead should not control if doing so would be contrary 
to the interests of the living. 
In contrast, a number of legal scholars and political philosophers have 
argued that courts should defer to the wishes of the donor even after the 
donor is dead.257  Moreover, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s 
 
 251. Reid Kress Weisbord, Trust Term Extension 5 (Oct. 28, 2013) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/sol3/papers/cfm?abstract_id=2346522. 
 252. Id. at 33.  Weisbord points out that this modern trend in trust law favoring 
beneficiaries is “particularly true of reforms envisioned by national law reform organizations 
such as the ALI and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 
responsible for publishing the Restatement (Third) of Trusts and the Uniform Trust Code, 
respectively.” Id.  In addition, Jeffrey Cooper observes that, over time, there has been a 
“subtle shift” in trust and fiduciary law:  “While the case law repeatedly reaffirms the 
traditional primacy of a settlor’s intent, the literature increasingly emphasizes the needs of 
trust beneficiaries and the dictates of modern investment theory.” Cooper, supra note 46, at 
1172 (footnotes omitted).  He concludes that “whereas the settlor’s word was once the sole 
source of authority, increasingly now ‘[t]here are three voices to which the fiduciary must 
listen,’” namely, the settlor, the beneficiaries, and the market. Id. (alteration in original) 
(quoting In re Will of Dumont, No. 1956TT443, 2004 WL 1468746, at *5 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 
June 25, 2004)). 
 253. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, supra note 20, at 103. 
 254. GODWIN, supra note 182, at 718. 
 255. HOBHOUSE, supra note 188, at 184–85. 
 256. Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562 (1942). 
 257. See, e.g., Jeremy Bentham, Utilitarian Basis of Succession, in THE RATIONAL BASIS 
OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 413, 420–21 (John H. Wigmore & Albert Kocourek eds., 1923); 
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pronouncement that the dead hand rules succession only by sufferance (as 
well as recent law reforms in favor of donees), most state and probate courts 
have continued to defer to a donor’s intent in determining the meaning of 
wills and trusts.258  Yet, one of the chief concerns in this perennial debate is 
that, irrespective of the desirability of allowing dead hand control, the state 
is likely to intervene in gratuitous transfers at death:  “The generation that is 
alive always enjoys the power to use property that the dead would have 
wanted to control and certainly has an interest in doing so.”259 
The difficulty, of course, is not that the law recognizes the interests of the 
donees.  After all, most gifts are given for the benefit of their donees.  
Rather, the difficulty is if courts and commentators fail to distinguish the 
interests of the donees from an ex post perspective versus the interests of 
the donees from an ex ante perspective.  That is, intervening to maximize 
the donees’ ex post interests, as distinct from the donees’ ex ante interests, 
is not a legitimate justification for restricting testamentary freedom. 
From an ex post perspective, restricting testamentary freedom in order to 
maximize the donees’ interests would be socially desirable.  However, as 
discussed, the ex post perspective does not incorporate the donor’s ex ante 
interests, including the donor’s happiness.260  Furthermore, the ex post 
perspective does not recognize that allowing the donees’ ex post interests to 
trump the donor’s ex ante wishes may be detrimental to the donees 
themselves because doing so can be inconsistent with the donees’ ex ante 
interests as a class. 
Disregarding donative intent may harm the donees as a class for a simple 
reason.  In response to a legal rule or judicial intervention, a donor can 
“wise up” and alter her behavior.  If the donor believes that the courts will 
not facilitate her intent, the donor may have an incentive to work less or 
consume more during life.261  Consequently, the donor may end up owning 
less property at death, meaning the donees will have less property to inherit 
from the donor. 
Moreover, even if the law does not alter the donor’s incentive to work, 
save, or invest, the donor may alter a gift.  As discussed above, the donor 
may change the timing of a gift, choose different donees, or forgo the gift 
altogether.262  As a result, donees as a class may be worse off if courts 
intervene on their behalf, even if it may be rational for individual donees to 
 
Epstein, supra note 237; see also Gallanis, supra note 12, at 237 (“In the late nineteenth 
century and for much of the twentieth century, American trust law moved in a contractarian, 
pro-settlor direction.”).  For an analysis of the arguments favoring or disfavoring dead hand 
control, see SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 67–71. 
 258. See supra note 45 and accompanying text; see also Weisbord, supra note 251, at 34 
(“With regard to the new direction of trust law, state legislatures have been slow to embrace 
the most aggressive reform efforts to contain dead hand control and recent case law reflects 
continued judicial fidelity to settlor intent when beneficiaries seek to upset the donor’s 
reasons for creating the trust.”). 
 259. SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 72. 
 260. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 261. See supra Part II.C.2. 
 262. See supra Part II.C.3. 
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attempt to modify a donor’s wishes.  If courts adopt an ex post perspective 
in determining whether to alter or modify a gratuitous transfer at death, they 
may end up favoring a legal rule in which everyone, including the donees, 
is worse off ex ante. 
Thus, while an economic analysis of succession law suggests that there 
are several theoretical justifications for restricting testamentary freedom—
imperfect information, negative externalities, and intergenerational equity—
disregarding donative intent to maximize the ex post interests of donees is 
problematic.  Consequently, legislators and courts, as well as legal scholars 
and law reformers, should carefully analyze whether the legal limitations on 
testamentary freedom are socially desirable from an ex ante perspective. 
2.  Idiosyncratic Preferences of Donors 
Most donors transfer their property at death to family members, friends, 
and charitable organizations.  However, occasionally, a donor may have 
highly idiosyncratic preferences.  Suppose a donor creates a multibillion-
dollar trust for the care of stray dogs.263  For example, Leona Helmsley left 
between $4 and $8 billion to a charitable trust for (1) the care of dogs; and 
(2) medical and health care services for indigent people, especially children.  
Subsequently, Helmsley deleted the provision benefitting indigent 
children.264  Should the law intervene to prevent Helmsley from using all 
her money for the care of dogs?  What if there are other, arguably more 
urgent, needs such as providing children with food, shelter, and clothing? 
As noted above, American succession law usually does not evaluate the 
dispositive provisions of a donative transfer for their “wisdom, fairness, or 
reasonableness.”265  However, courts may refrain from enforcing a will or 
trust that entails a gift that is clearly for a “capricious” purpose.266  Thus, 
while the law typically focuses on facilitating the donor’s intent, in certain 
extreme cases in which a donor’s preferences are highly idiosyncratic, such 
as giving billions of dollars for the care of dogs, a court may not enforce the 
gift or may reduce the amount of the gift.267 
 
 263. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 90, at 425 (“Almost every state has enacted 
legislation that permits a trust for a pet animal for the life of the animal and often other non-
charitable purposes such as perpetual maintenance of a grave.”). 
 264. See Jeffrey Toobin, Rich Bitch:  The Legal Battle over Trust Funds for Pets, NEW 
YORKER, Sept. 29, 2008, at 38. 
 265. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:  WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 
cmt. c (2003). 
 266. See Tamara York, Protecting Minor Children from Parental Disinheritance:  A 
Proposal for Awarding a Compulsory Share of the Parental Estate, 1997 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
861, 878–79 (“Where the testator’s provision is merely capricious and the performance of 
the provision will benefit no one, the courts will not compel its execution, despite the wishes 
of the testator.”). 
 267. Cf. UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 408–409, 7C U.L.A. 490–95 (2010); UNIF. PROBATE CODE 
§ 2-907(b) (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. pt. I, at 239–40 (2010).  For example, in the Helmsley 
case, the court ultimately reduced the award to Helmsley’s dog, Trouble, from $12 million to 
$2 million. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 90, at 426.  At Trouble’s death in 2010, 
the funds remaining in the dog’s trust were added to Helmsley’s charitable trust, which was 
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From an economic perspective, restricting testamentary freedom because 
a donor’s preferences are idiosyncratic, even highly idiosyncratic, is not 
warranted.268  On the economic view, all preferences are subjective, and all 
preferences count in the social welfare function.269  Consequently, there is 
no objective standard to say that the utility that Ms. Helmsley derives from 
taking care of these dogs should not count in social welfare.  Consider as 
well that during life Helmsley was free to spend as much of her money for 
the care of dogs as she wished.270  Of course, if a donative transfer—either 
during life or at death—entails negative externalities, these externalities 
may provide an independent justification for restricting the transfer.271  But, 
from an economic perspective, the idiosyncratic or objectionable nature of a 
donor’s preferences would not, by itself, provide a legitimate justification 
for intervening in a donor’s disposition of property. 
This type of example, while relatively rare, may illustrate one limitation 
of the economic approach.  Economic analysis assumes that preferences are 
subjective and does not question an individual’s preferences.  Therefore, 
unless a donor is imposing external harm on others, there is no economic 
justification for second-guessing the substance of the donor’s disposition.  
To be sure, there are strong policy reasons for why granting courts broad 
authority to second-guess the choices of donors might be problematic.  
Having courts regularly exercise their discretion in evaluating whether gifts 
are “socially desirable” would entail significant information costs and 
administrative costs.272  Even if courts were institutionally capable of 
making this determination at a reasonable cost, preventing donors from 
circumventing such limitations would involve substantial enforcement 
costs.273  Because courts may have difficulty weighing the social costs and 
benefits of each gift, the law typically defers to the donor’s intent.  But, in 
 
worth more than $4 billion in 2012 (although the courts had ruled that the trustees were not 
required to use the funds in the charitable trust only for the care of dogs). Id. 
 268. Cf. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 103, at 418–31 (“[T]he arguments that are usually 
presented against crediting objectionable preferences are problematic.”). 
 269. See id. (“Under a welfare economic analysis, any actual preference is given weight 
because it reflects an individual’s actual well-being; there is no a priori basis under welfare 
economics for ignoring certain preferences.”). 
 270. Comparing inter vivos gifts and testamentary gifts is often illuminating in evaluating 
the potential justifications for restricting testamentary freedom.  If a certain type of gift (e.g., 
gifts for the care of dogs) is legally permissible during life, then the question is under what 
circumstances, if any, the same gift should not be permissible at death.  Other examples in 
which this distinction may be relevant are conditional gifts, see infra text accompanying note 
286, and the destruction of property, see infra notes 308–09, 315 and accompanying text. 
 271. See supra Part III.A.2; see also Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 103, at 427–29 
(suggesting that externalities is one reason that “satisfying certain types of preferences may 
be counterproductive in terms of the overall well-being of members of society”). 
 272. Cf. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 28, at 12 n.42 (noting that an approach “giving 
courts (instead of testators) discretion to divide estates . . . would . . . entail substantially 
higher information and administrative costs”). 
 273. Cf. id. at 11 (“A secondary justification for the right of testation is that it would in 
practice be difficult to curtail.  Were lawmakers to rescind the power of the will, testators 
would find other, less efficient ways to direct the distribution of their wealth.”). 
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extreme cases, the divergence between a donor’s private interest and the 
social interest could justify modifying a gratuitous transfer at death.274 
IV.  LEGAL LIMITATIONS ON TESTAMENTARY FREEDOM 
Having explored the primary justifications for restricting testamentary 
freedom—both legitimate (imperfect information, negative externalities, 
and intergenerational equity) and illegitimate (maximizing the donees’ ex 
post interests and ignoring a donor’s idiosyncratic preferences), this Article 
applies these justifications to evaluate the law’s limitations on the freedom 
of testation.  The objective is to investigate the extent to which existing law 
converges with or diverges from these economic justifications.  Throughout 
the analysis, I also suggest ways in which legislatures and courts could 
incorporate economic insights into law reform and judicial review. 
A.  Three Contested Examples 
I begin by analyzing three examples involving dead hand control:  
(1) conditional bequests and incentive trusts, (2) the destruction of property 
at death, and (3) trust modification and termination. 
1.  Conditional Bequests and Incentive Trusts 
Historically, donors have included a wide variety of conditions in their 
bequests.275  In modern estate planning, “conditional gifts . . . are typically 
made in trust,” i.e., “incentive trusts.”276  Among the most common types 
of conditions in trusts are incentives for educational attainment, conditions 
based on deeply held moral and religious beliefs, and incentives for work 
and productivity.277 
 
 274. Another example would be gifts that are racially discriminatory.  Gifts involving 
discrimination entail negative effects on others, and these negative externalities provide a 
justification for prohibiting such gifts. See supra notes 229–30 and accompanying text.  
However, even assuming the “benefits” to the donor of discriminating exceed the social 
costs of the donor’s discrimination, society might prohibit the gift on the basis that such 
“benefits” should not count in social welfare. See John J. Donohue, Antidiscrimination Law, 
in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 16, at 1387, 1418 (“The moral 
judgment that discriminatory preferences should not enter the social welfare calculus might 
be analogized to the standard philosophical argument that malicious preferences—those 
benefits that derive from the suffering of others—must be outside the welfare calculus.”); cf. 
Shelly Kreiczer Levy & Meital Pinto, Property and Belongingness:  Rethinking Gender-
Biased Disinheritance, 21 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 119, 119 (2011) (arguing that “the law 
should not protect gender-biased bequests”). 
 275. For example, testators may include conditions that discourage a surviving spouse 
from remarrying, see, e.g., In re Estate of Robertson, 859 N.E.2d 772 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), 
prohibit a child from renting property while married to a specific person, see, e.g., In re 
Estate of Owen, 855 N.E.2d 603 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), and encourage a devisee to marry a 
person of a particular religion.  On conditional bequests, see generally Hirsch, supra note 49. 
 276. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 90, at 9–10.  On incentive trusts, see Marjorie J. 
Stephens, Incentive Trusts:  Considerations, Uses, and Alternatives, 29 ACTEC J. 5 (2003), 
and Tate, supra note 168. 
 277. See Tate, supra note 168, at 453. 
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To illustrate, consider the gift at issue in the classic case of Shapira v. 
Union National Bank.278  In Shapira, the testator, Dr. David Shapira, left a 
share of his residuary estate to his son, Daniel, provided that “he is married 
at the time of my death to a Jewish girl whose both parents were Jewish,” or 
that, within seven years after the testator’s death, he marries “a Jewish girl 
whose both parents were Jewish.”279  Dr. Shapira provided a gift over:  if 
Daniel was not so married after seven years, Daniel’s share was to go to the 
State of Israel.280 
In rejecting Daniel’s claim that the restrictions upon marriage in the will 
were unconstitutional or contrary to public policy, the court considered 
whether this partial restraint on marriage was reasonable.  In making this 
determination, the court analyzed, among other things, Daniel’s age (21) 
and whether he had a “reasonable latitude of choice” of eligible women.281  
Ultimately, the court concluded that “public policy should not, and does not 
preclude the fulfillment of Dr. Shapira’s purpose, and that in accordance 
with the weight of authority in this country, the conditions contained in his 
will are reasonable restrictions upon marriage, and valid.”282 
From an ex post perspective, Daniel’s claim seems strong and the court’s 
conclusion seems erroneous.  In challenging the condition, Daniel clearly 
preferred to receive his share of the estate outright, rather than subject to 
any conditions, including conditions on whom he could or could not marry.  
He believed that the condition in his father’s will was unreasonable, 
especially given his fundamental right to marry, and he argued that his 
father’s dead hand should not interfere with or control such a personal and 
important decision. 
Several scholars are sympathetic to Daniel’s dilemma.  Posner suggests 
that, in cases like Shapira, perhaps judges should have the power to modify 
conditions on testamentary gifts using a doctrine like cy pres: 
Consider . . . the possibilities for modification that would exist if the gift 
were inter vivos rather than testamentary.  As the deadline approached, 
the son might come to his father and persuade him that a diligent search 
had revealed no marriageable Jewish girl who would accept him.  The 
father might be persuaded to grant an extension or otherwise relax the 
condition.  If the father is dead, this kind of “recontracting” is impossible, 
and the presumption that the condition is a reasonable one fails.  This 
argues for applying the cy pres approach in private as well as charitable 
trust cases . . . .283 
In addition, in analyzing testamentary restraints on conjugal and religious 
choices—what he describes as “posthumous meddling”—Jeffrey Sherman 
 
 278. 315 N.E.2d 825 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1974). 
 279. Id. at 826. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. at 831. 
 282. Id. at 832. 
 283. POSNER, supra note 19, at 699. 
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argues that a condition like the one in Shapira should be per se invalid.284  
Sherman contends that “a blanket rule invalidating all testamentary 
restraints that condition bounty on the legatee’s ‘proper’ choice of spouse is 
simpler and more predictable in its application, and more principled in its 
foundation, than the current judicial response.”285 
The views of Posner and Sherman appear to be consistent with the 
modern trend regarding conditional bequests and incentive trusts.  In 1974, 
at the time of the Shapira decision, it may have been true that the “great 
weight of authority in the United States” was that “gifts conditioned upon 
the beneficiary’s marrying within a particular religious class of faith are 
reasonable.”286  Now, by contrast, the Restatement (Third) of Trusts 
invalidates trusts that are “contrary to public policy”287 and suggests that 
these types of cases are “unfortunate.”288 
From an ex ante perspective, are there other considerations that may be 
relevant?  Of course, the testator, Dr. David Shapira, as well as similarly 
situated testators, might prefer for the court to enforce these types of 
conditions.  But one question might be:  what would Dr. Shapira have done 
ex ante if he had known or believed a court would not enforce such a 
condition ex post?  Consider three possible scenarios.  First, Shapira might 
have made the same bequest to his son Daniel outright in fee simple, i.e., 
without any conditions.  Second, to circumvent the court’s refusal to 
enforce the condition, Shapira may have relied upon a secret trust, in which 
another person would hold property for Daniel’s benefit and distribute the 
property to Daniel in accordance with Shapira’s prior instructions.  Third, 
Shapira may have chosen to leave Daniel no gift or a much smaller bequest. 
From the ex ante perspective, i.e., at the time that Dr. Shapira is deciding 
how to structure his gift, both Daniel and his father may be better off if the 
law does not prohibit the condition.  By assuring Shapira and other donors 
that a court will enforce the condition, the law at least gives Daniel and 
other donees an option to comply with the condition.  If the condition is 
unenforceable, Daniel may have no choice at all, because David may decide 
to structure the bequest differently and leave Daniel nothing at all.  In this 
case, if Shapira and his son would have negotiated in advance, which would 
Daniel have chosen:  having an option to comply with and thereby receive 
the gift, or complete disinheritance?  If Daniel would prefer an option to 
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1275. 
 285. Id. at 1322. 
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 287. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29(c) (2003). 
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919 N.E.2d 888 (Ill. 2009) (concluding that a trust clause providing that a grandchild would 
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Disinherits Children Who Failed Religious Test, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 2000, at A1. 
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comply over disinheritance, then a court’s refusing to enforce the 
conditional gift may make Daniel, as well as his father, worse off.  In 
addition, during his life, Shapira could have given the same conditional gift 
to his son, even if he was unwilling to renegotiate the condition.289   
Posner himself recognizes that the applicable legal rule may affect how 
donors structure their gifts at the outset.  He notes, “The strongest objection 
to these paternalistic interventions is that in the long run, as testators ‘wise 
up’ to the courts’ policy of refusing to enforce conditions that the judges 
deem unreasonable, they will curtail bequests.”290  He explains, “The 
refusal of courts to enforce such conditions will not make such people 
change their minds, but only change their wills.”291  Thus, in cases like 
Shapira, facilitating donative intent may be consistent not only with 
maximizing the donor’s interest but also with promoting social welfare.292  
Indeed, Daniel himself, as well as similarly situated donees, might benefit if 
the court enforces this type of conditional bequest.293 
2.  Destruction of Property at Death294 
One of the most extraordinary assertions of dead hand control arises in 
cases involving the “right to destroy” property at death.295  In a few cases, a 
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earlier discussion of this issue. See Kelly, supra note 29, at 882–85. 
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See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right To Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781 (2005); see also 
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testator has instructed an executor to destroy the testator’s home or other 
buildings.296  For example, in Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co.,297 Louis 
Woodruff Johnston owned a home in an affluent neighborhood of St. Louis, 
Missouri.  Johnston died on January 14, 1973, and by her will directed her 
executor to destroy her home, sell the land, and transfer the proceeds to her 
estate.298  Plaintiffs, owners of neighboring parcels, objected to this 
provision of Johnston’s will, arguing, among other things, that razing 
Johnston’s home would adversely affect their property rights and be 
contrary to public policy.299   
Ultimately, the court ruled in favor of the neighbors, concluding that, by 
mandating that the executor enforce the provisions of the will, “all are 
harmed and only the caprice of the dead testatrix is served.”300  The court 
reasoned:  “Destruction of the house harms the neighbors, detrimentally 
affects the community, causes monetary loss in excess of $39,000.00 to the 
estate and is without benefit to the dead woman.”301  The court added, “A 
well-ordered society cannot tolerate the waste and destruction of resources 
when such acts directly affect important interests of other members of that 
society.”302 
Perhaps more common are situations in which the testator has an interest 
in destroying personal property, such as private papers or diaries,303 
unpublished manuscripts,304 or unfinished symphonies.305  For example, 
Justice Hugo Black believed the “private notes of the justices relating to 
Court conferences should not be published posthumously.”306  But suppose 
Justice Black had not destroyed his conference notes before death and that 
his will had directed his executor to destroy his notes.  The question is:  
“Should a court order destruction of the notes, which might have enormous 
value to a Court historian?”307  Or would facilitating freedom of disposition 
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 303. See Strahilevitz, supra note 295, at 812 (“The destruction of diaries and other papers 
is commonplace, even when those written works have enormous economic value.” (citing 
Nixon v. United States, 978 F.2d 1269, 1279–80 (D.C. Cir. 1992))). 
 304. See POSNER, supra note 19, at 699–700; see also DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 
90, at 15. 
 305. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 90, at 15. 
 306. Id. at 37; see also SAX, supra note 295, at 93–116 (discussing papers of the Supreme 
Court justices); ALEXANDRA K. WIGDOR, THE PERSONAL PAPERS OF SUPREME COURT 
JUSTICES:  A DESCRIPTIVE GUIDE 31–34 (1986) (discussing the justices’ collections of 
personal and professional papers and noting that several justices, including Owen Josephus 
Roberts and Edward Douglas White, purposely destroyed their papers). 
 307. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 90, at 37. 
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to this extent represent the triumph of the dead hand over the lives of the 
living?  Recent cases suggest there is a general trend among the courts not 
to allow testators to destroy socially valuable property at death.308 
Ex post, there is a plausible justification for distinguishing between 
destruction of property during life, which the law generally permits, and 
destruction of property at death, which courts increasingly do not permit.  
During life, owners directly internalize the burdens and benefits of their 
actions.  Thus, it is usually safe to assume that an owner will destroy 
property only if he or she believes the benefits of doing so outweigh the 
costs.309  By contrast, it would appear that, after death, the owner no longer 
internalizes the burdens and benefits of her actions.  Thus, an owner might 
destroy property once dead, even if others might benefit from the property.  
In other words, the destruction of property at death might entail waste.310 
Ex ante, however, there are additional considerations.  First, if a court is 
unwilling to allow an owner to destroy property at death, the owner may 
experience a loss during life.311  Justice Black, for example, may have 
experienced anxiety about the possible publication of his notes.  Second, 
knowing a court will not enforce such a provision, the owner may choose to 
destroy the property during life (i.e., sooner than the owner otherwise 
would have destroyed the property).312  Justice Black died shortly after 
destroying his notes,313 but suppose that, after destroying his notes, he had 
recovered, remained on the Supreme Court, and wished to consult the notes 
he had destroyed.  Third, an owner’s inability to destroy property at death 
may reduce the incentive to create property during life.314  Justice Black (or 
other justices) may decide not to take notes during the Court’s conferences.  
Fourth, prohibiting destruction could alter how the testator or other parties 
act and speak today.  Justice Black’s chief concern was that posthumously 
publishing the justices’ notes might adversely affect the Court’s deliberative 
 
 308. See Strahilevitz, supra note 295, at 796 (“Based on a reading of recent judicial 
opinions, it appears that the conventional wisdom has turned against permitting a property 
owner to destroy valuable property.”). 
 309. See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 96, at 518. 
 310. See Strahilevitz, supra note 295, at 796 (“Concern about wasting valuable resources 
is, by far, the most commonly voiced justification for restricting an owner’s ability to destroy 
her property.” (citing Edward J. McCaffery, Must We Have the Right To Waste?, in NEW 
ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 76 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 
2001))). 
 311. See SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 68; see also DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 295, at 
37 (asking rhetorically:  “[I]f the testator expects that her wishes for post-death destruction 
of her property will not be followed, will she suffer a loss (in money or pleasure) during life 
from knowing that her destructive wishes will not be honored after her death?”). 
 312. See POSNER, supra note 19, at 549 (“In the case of the direction to destroy the art 
work, a testator can destroy the work himself if he doesn’t think the direction will be 
enforced.”); cf. supra note 183 and accompanying text (discussing the “King Lear 
problem”). 
 313. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 90, at 14. 
 314. Cf. SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 65 (interfering with bequests “lowers . . . incentives 
to work” because a “person will not work as hard to accumulate property if he cannot then 
bequeath it as he pleases”). 
1176 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
process.315  In any event, a testator may internalize the costs of destruction, 
even destruction after death, because the testator bears the opportunity costs 
of not selling a remainder interest in the property during life.316 
Of course, there may be other economic justifications for restricting a 
testator’s freedom to destroy property at death.  Perhaps a testator did not 
foresee or failed to specify all potential contingencies and, due to an 
unforeseen or unprovided-for contingency, destruction is inconsistent with 
the testator’s probable intention.317  Or maybe, as in Eyerman, destroying 
the property will impose harmful effects on neighbors.318  Perhaps future 
generations value the property’s existence more than the testator values its 
destruction and there is no market mechanism to facilitate a mutually 
beneficial exchange.319  Each of these economic justifications may provide 
a legitimate reason for disallowing a person to destroy property at death.  
However, it is impossible to evaluate a testator’s “right to destroy” property 
at death in particular, or dead hand control in general, without incorporating 
ex ante considerations into the analysis.320 
3.  Trust Modification and Termination 
The legal systems of the United Kingdom and United States embody very 
different perspectives on wealth transmission through donative trusts.  
Representative of these differences are the legal rules governing trust 
modification and termination.  In either legal system, the settlor has the 
ability not only to modify or terminate a revocable trust but also to modify 
or terminate an irrevocable trust if the settlor and all the beneficiaries agree.  
But suppose, as is often the case, that a settlor refuses to consent or is 
unable to consent (e.g., because the settlor is dead).  The United Kingdom 
and United States then diverge on a fundamental question:  Are the 
beneficiaries permitted to modify or terminate an irrevocable trust if all the 
beneficiaries—but not the settlor—agree to do so? 
In the United Kingdom, if all the beneficiaries consent, the law permits 
trust modification or termination.  The doctrine is well established, having 
 
 315. See JOHN PAUL FRANK, INSIDE HUGO L. BLACK:  THE LETTERS 61–62 (2000); see also 
WIGDOR, supra note 306, at 48 (reporting that Justice Black’s son recalled that his father 
believed that “reports by one Justice of another’s conduct in the heat of a difference might 
unfairly and inaccurately reflect history”). 
 316. See SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 68 (“[T]he detriment to the living due to dead hand 
control of property is not ignored by a person who wants dead hand control, but rather is 
taken into at least implicit account by such a person.”); see also Strahilevitz, supra note 295, 
at 840. 
 317. See supra Part III.A; see also POSNER, supra note 19, at 699–700; SHAVELL, supra 
note 10, at 70. 
 318. See supra Part III.B; see also Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co., 524 S.W.2d 210, 
214 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (“Destruction of the house harms the neighbors . . . .”). 
 319. See supra Part III.C.  Note, however, that this rationale generally does not limit a 
testator’s right to destroy property during life, except in certain limited circumstances such 
as historical preservation, endangered species, and an artist’s moral rights. 
 320. See Strahilevitz, supra note 295, at 808 (“[An] ex ante perspective can be 
determinative when society must decide whether to permit or prohibit the destruction of 
certain kinds of property.”). 
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been articulated almost two centuries ago in Saunders v. Vautier.321  In 
Saunders, Richard Wright executed a will and testamentary trust leaving his 
East India Stock in trust for the benefit of Daniel Wright Vautier, with 
instructions to distribute the principal and accumulated interest to Vautier 
once he attained the age of twenty-five.322  At age twenty-one, Vautier, 
eager to obtain the stock (ultimately worth £2000 plus interest, then a 
considerable sum),323 rather than the £100 per year the court had awarded 
as maintenance, petitioned the court and sought termination of the trust.  In 
ruling for Vautier, the court held that a beneficiary can terminate a trust if 
all the beneficiaries (here, just Vautier) are competent adults who consent to 
terminating the trust.324 
In contrast, in the United States, even if all the beneficiaries agree to 
modify or terminate a trust, the law does not necessarily permit 
modification or termination.  The traditional American rule is that “a trust 
cannot be terminated or modified on petition of all the beneficiaries if doing 
so would be contrary to a material purpose of the settlor.”325  This 
“material purpose” test is widely known as the Claflin doctrine because of 
its origins in Claflin v. Claflin,326 the American counterpart to Saunders.327  
In Claflin, as in Saunders, the beneficiary, Adelbert Claflin, sued to 
terminate an irrevocable trust.  Like Vautier, Claflin claimed that, because 
he had reached the age of twenty-one and was the sole beneficiary of the 
trust, he was entitled to the corpus, even though he had not yet reached 
thirty, the age the settlor had specified.328  Unlike the English court in 
Saunders, the American court in Claflin refused to permit the beneficiary to 
terminate the trust prematurely; allowing the beneficiary to do so, the court 
reasoned, would violate the settlor’s intent.329 
What explains this doctrinal divergence on trust modification and 
termination in the United Kingdom (and nearly all Commonwealth 
countries) and the United States?330  The conventional explanation for the 
 
 321. (1841) 49 Eng. Rep. 282 (Ch.).  The rule in Saunders v. Vautier remains good law.  
Indeed, in 1958, Parliament extended the scope of the rule in enacting the Variation of Trusts 
Act, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 53, § 1 (1958) (U.K.), which establishes that “a court may consent to 
modification or termination of a trust on behalf of incompetent, minor, or unborn 
beneficiaries if the court finds it beneficial to those beneficiaries.” DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, 
supra note 90, at 718; see also Joshua Getzler, Transplantation and Mutation in Anglo-
American Trust Law, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 355, 371 (2009). 
 322. Saunders, 49 Eng. Rep. at 282. 
 323. Wright died in 1832, and £2000 then converts to over $200,000. See Eric Nye, 
Pounds Sterling to Dollars:  Historical Conversion of Currency, UNIV. WYO., 
http://uwacadweb.uwyo.edu/numimage/currency.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2013). 
 324. See Saunders, 49 Eng. Rep. at 282. 
 325. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 90, at 719. 
 326. 20 N.E. 454 (Mass. 1889). 
 327. Justice Walbridge Field, writing for the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 
cites Saunders, as well as several other English cases, in his opinion. See id. at 455. 
 328. See id. 
 329. Id. at 456. 
 330. According to a study by Paul Matthews, the rule emanating from Saunders is found 
“not only in England, but also in nearly all Commonwealth countries.” Paul Matthews, The 
Comparative Importance of the Rule in Saunders v. Vautier, 122 L.Q. REV. 266, 282 (2006) 
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divergence is that these legal systems, despite their common origin, have 
conflicting views of dead hand control and the question of whose property 
is it—the settlor’s or the beneficiaries’—once the settlor has died.331  For 
the English, the donor’s intention is “not . . . of any relevance whatever,” 
whereas for the Americans, the donor’s intention “ought to be carried 
out.”332  And, whereas for the English, “the beneficiaries are entitled” to 
use the trust property, for the Americans, “a testator has a right to dispose 
of his own property.”333 
Ultimately, this explanation is not satisfying, however.  It may be true 
that English law disregards the donor’s intention, while American law 
privileges intention as the controlling consideration.  It also may be true that 
English law considers the trust to be the beneficiaries’ property, while 
American law considers it to be, functionally, the settlor’s property.334  But 
what explains these underlying differences?  Is there any divergence in the 
mode of legal reasoning or policy analysis that might result in such 
disparate outcomes on the same issue?  My hypothesis is that, in attempting 
to explain these differences, the distinction between ex ante and ex post 
considerations is relevant.335  Specifically, the competing approaches to the 
issue of trust modification and termination may stem from a failure to 
identify and distinguish between the ex ante and ex post perspective. 
Ex post, the English view (Saunders) has a certain degree of plausibility.  
Once a settlor is dead, it seems as if the beneficiary or beneficiaries, 
assuming they all agree, should be permitted to terminate the trust and 
utilize the property in whatever manner they deem best.  Not permitting 
modification or termination would mean the property would not be devoted 
to its highest valued use.  The extension of this approach in the Variation of 
Trusts Act, which allows English courts to consent on behalf of 
incompetent, minor, or unborn beneficiaries, might be beneficial as well.336  
Again, under these circumstances, without modification or termination, the 
 
(citing articles that discuss Saunders’s influence in Australia, Bailiwick of Jersey, Canada, 
the Caribbean, Ceylon, Ireland, Nigeria, and South Africa). 
 331. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 90, at 718 (“What has happened in England 
and the Commonwealth is that, after a trust becomes irrevocable, the trust property is 
regarded as belonging to the beneficiaries, and the dead hand continues to rule only by 
sufferance of the beneficiaries.”). 
 332. Compare Goulding v. James, (1997) 2 All E.R. 239 (C.A.) at 252 (Eng.) (Gibson, 
L.J.), with Claflin v. Claflin, 20 N.E. 454, 456 (Mass. 1889) (Field, J.).  Lord Justice 
Mummery’s opinion in Goulding is also in accord with the traditional English view. 
Goulding, 2 All E.R. at 247 (Mummery, L.J.) (“The principle recognises the rights of 
beneficiaries . . . to overbear and defeat the intention of a testator or settlor.”). 
 333. Compare Goulding, 2 All E.R. at 252 (Gibson, L.J.), with Claflin, 20 N.E. at 456 
(Field, J.). 
 334. For a recent examination of related issues in the United States, particularly in the 
context of trust investment law, see John H. Langbein, Burn the Rembrandt?  Trust Law’s 
Limits on the Settlor’s Power To Direct Investment, 90 B.U. L. REV. 375, 378–85 (2010). 
 335. Cf. Sitkoff, supra note 15, at 657–58 (describing trust modification and termination 
as a “useful example” of “how the law balances the ex post preferences of the beneficiaries 
with the ex ante wishes of the settlor”). 
 336. See Variation of Trusts Act, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 53, § 1 (1958) (U.K.). 
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beneficiaries would not be able to use the property in the manner they deem 
best, meaning the property may not be devoted to its highest use. 
Yet, once ex ante considerations are incorporated into the analysis, the 
American view (Claflin) arguably has some merit.  If a settlor knows the 
beneficiaries can easily convince a court to modify or terminate the trust 
once the settlor has died, the settlor may receive less satisfaction during life 
or have less incentive to accumulate property.  Moreover, the settlor may 
anticipate the possibility of a court’s modifying or terminating the trust and 
alter the structure or timing of the gift.  Or the settlor may decide not to give 
the gift at all.  Indeed, once ex ante considerations are incorporated, 
beneficiaries may themselves favor the American rule for precisely this 
reason.  Sitkoff points out that “though a particular beneficiary might prefer 
the power to terminate the trust once it is established, the Claflin doctrine is 
advantageous to potential beneficiaries as a class because it increases the 
willingness of grantors to create a trust in the first place.”337 
Of course, there are situations in which modifying or terminating an 
irrevocable trust might be beneficial, even from the ex ante perspective.  
One situation is if the settlor has died but a contingency arises that the 
settlor could not or did not anticipate.338 Countless circumstances may 
arise, and it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the donor to anticipate 
every potential contingency.  Even if it were possible, the costs of expressly 
specifying each contingency could outweigh the benefits of attempting to 
do so.339  If the provisions of the trust are incomplete, the inability to 
modify the trust would mean a failure to carry out the donor’s probable 
intent, including what the donor would have specified if the donor had the 
ability and resources to address each contingency explicitly.340  For this 
reason, authorizing perpetual trusts may be especially problematic, at least 
in the absence of some mechanism for judicial modification.341 
Incorporating the ex ante perspective is useful not only for engaging in a 
comparative inquiry of trust modification and termination in the United 
Kingdom and United States.  The American rule, based on Claflin, has itself 
been subject to varying degrees of criticism,342 and the Restatement (Third) 
of Trusts and Uniform Trust Code have embraced different approaches.  
Section 65 of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts permits modification or 
termination in cases in which doing so would be inconsistent with the 
“material purpose” of a trust.343 The UTC permits modification or 
termination under certain circumstances without the consent of all the 
beneficiaries.344  In addition, a number of state reforms—some modeled on 
 
 337. Sitkoff, supra note 15, at 659. 
 338. See supra Part III.A. 
 339. See id. 
 340. See id. 
 341. Cf. CHESTER, supra note 28, at 47–58, 117 (advocating liberal modification of 
trusts). 
 342. See Sitkoff, supra note 15, at 660 (noting “a strong academic and slowly emerging 
decisional trend toward liberalizing these rules” of trust modification and termination). 
 343. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65 (2003). 
 344. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 411(e) (amended 2004), 7C U.L.A. 498 (2010). 
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the Restatement, others modeled on the UTC—have altered the traditional 
rules governing trust modification and termination.345 
Distinguishing between ex ante and ex post considerations will be as 
important in evaluating these variations on Claflin within the United States, 
as in comparing the English and American approach to trust modification 
and termination.346  At a minimum, the analysis should acknowledge that 
overriding a material purpose (based on a judicial determination that 
countervailing considerations outweigh the material purpose) or permitting 
modification without all the beneficiaries’ consent (based on a judicial 
determination that any nonconsenting beneficiaries will be adequately 
protected) has the potential to change a settlor’s incentives.  And, given the 
risk of judicial intervention, settlors may decide to alter the structure or 
timing of their gifts, which may be detrimental to the beneficiaries.347 
B.  Other Legal Limitations 
Contemporary disputes about issues like conditional gifts and trust 
modification and termination illustrate the relevance of the ex ante/ex post 
distinction in evaluating restrictions on testamentary freedom.  However, 
succession law restricts testamentary freedom in several other ways.  In this 
section, I briefly discuss a number of these restrictions and their possible 
economic justifications. 
First, there are several restrictions on the permissible purposes of wills 
and trusts.  For example, a testator cannot execute a will and a settlor cannot 
create a trust for a purpose that is illegal.348  Restrictions that discriminate 
invidiously based on race or other protected categories are also invalid.349  
 
 345. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 15403 (West 1991 & Supp. 2013) (permitting 
modification or termination, even if “continuance of the trust is necessary to carry out a 
material purpose of the trust,” if all beneficiaries consent and the “court, in its discretion, 
determines that the reason for [modifying or terminating the trust] . . . outweighs the interest 
in accomplishing a material purpose of the trust,” unless the trust contains a spendthrift 
provision); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5804.11(D) (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2013) (adopting 
provisions analogous to UNIF. TRUST CODE § 411, 7C U.L.A. at 497–98); see also Peter J. 
Wiedenbeck, Missouri’s Repeal of the Claflin Doctrine—New View of the Policy Against 
Perpetuities?, 50 MO. L. REV. 805 (1985) (discussing earlier reforms to Claflin). 
 346. It is worth noting that even the recent variations on Claflin within the United States 
differ from the U.K. approach because these U.S. variations continue to emphasize the 
intent, or probable intent, of the settlor. See Sitkoff, supra note 15, at 661–63. 
 347. Many settlors continue to include age limitations in their trusts, like the provisions at 
issue in Saunders and Claflin.  For example, Whitney Houston’s will and testamentary trust 
contained limitations based on the age of her primary beneficiary, her daughter Bobbi 
Kristina, who was still a teenager at the time of her mother’s death. See Whitney Houston 
Leaves Everything to Her Daughter, Bobbi Kristina, ABC NEWS (Mar. 7, 2012), 
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/entertainment/2012/03/whitney-houston-leaves-everything-to-
her-daughter-bobbi-kristina/ (noting that, under the testamentary trust, “the 19-year-old will 
have to wait until she’s 30 to inherit everything”). 
 348. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29(a) (“An intended trust or trust 
provision is invalid if . . . its purpose or performance is unlawful or . . . its performance calls 
for the commission of a criminal or tortious act.”). 
 349. See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 302 (1966) (holding that a racial 
restriction in the bequest of land in trust was void under the Fourteenth Amendment); see 
also supra notes 73–74, 230–31, 274, 293 and accompanying text. 
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Moreover, as discussed above, the law prohibits a bequest if the gift is 
capricious or frivolous.350  Each limitation seems justifiable because of 
negative externalities (consider the social costs of encouraging crime or 
discriminating against others) or perhaps due to idiosyncratic preferences 
that the law ignores or discounts.351 
Second, several limitations on testamentary freedom involve family 
members and relatives.  The spousal elective share prevents a donor from 
disinheriting a surviving spouse.352  The law prohibits conditional bequests 
that create unreasonable restraints on marriage.353  And courts have 
invalidated terms that interfere with the mother-child relationship,354 sibling 
interaction,355 and other family relationships.356 
As noted above, the elective share may be necessary to prevent the 
external costs that a decedent can impose on the public by disinheriting a 
spouse.357  By contrast, each state (except Louisiana) allows donors to 
disinherit their children, including minor children, even though a similar 
type of externality might exist.358  It is an empirical question how often 
such disinheritance occurs in the United States.  It seems likely that most 
donors provide for their children directly or give property to their surviving 
spouse with the expectation that the spouse will use this property to provide 
for their children.  Moreover, even if a decedent does not provide for 
children at all, the default rule allowing filial disinheritance is based on an 
expectation that, in most of the remaining cases, a surviving spouse can 
utilize the spousal elective share to support minor children.359   
 
 350. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. m (“It is against public policy 
to enforce a trust provision that would divert distributions or administration from the 
interests of the beneficiaries to other purposes that are capricious or frivolous.”). 
 351. Sometimes legal intervention is justifiable because of imperfect information, as well 
as negative externalities, as in the case of the “slayer” rules governing a murdering heir. See 
POSNER, supra note 19, at 693 (“The rule against allowing the testator’s murderer to inherit 
thus serves the by now familiar function of reading into a contract or conveyance an implied 
term to govern remote contingencies.”). 
 352. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202, 8 U.L.A. at 89–90 (Supp. 2013). 
 353. See, e.g., In re Estate of Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d 888 (Ill. 2009); see also supra Part 
IV.A.1 (discussing Shapira). 
 354. See, e.g., In re Carples’ Estate, 250 N.Y.S. 680, 681–89 (Sur. Ct. 1931). 
 355. See, e.g., Girard Trust Co. v. Schmitz, 20 A.2d 21, 27–37 (N.J. Ch. 1941). 
 356. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. j (“The policy against undermining 
family relationships applies as well to trust provisions that discourage a person from living 
with or caring for a parent or child or from social interaction with siblings.”). 
 357. See supra notes 9, 75, 233–34 and accompanying text. 
 358. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 359. Cf. Christina Donato Saler, Note, Pennsylvania Law Should No Longer Allow a 
Parent’s Right to Testamentary Freedom To Outweigh the Dependent Child’s “Absolute 
Right to Child Support,” 34 RUTGERS L.J. 235, 254 (2002) (discussing how, even if “the 
deceased parent of a nuclear family may have disinherited his children,” marital children can 
receive “indirect financial support, i.e., spousal elective share”).  However, Langbein argues 
that even the spousal elective share may do more harm than good.  He concludes that the 
intentional disinheritance of spouses is relatively rare, whereas later-in-life marriages, which 
can alter a distribution of property due to the elective share, are increasingly common. See 
John H. Langbein, Professor of Law, The Uniform Probate Code:  Remaking of American 
Succession Law (Oct. 21, 2011), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=rOiTcRdKHhI; see also Terry L. Turnipseed, Why Shouldn’t I Be Allowed To Leave My 
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Third, the law contains several longstanding rules, including the rule 
against unreasonable restraints on alienation and rules against perpetuities 
or accumulations, that restrict the transfer or accumulation of property over 
time.  The rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation limits the 
ability of a donor to transfer property to a donee while placing significant 
restrictions on the donee’s ability to transfer the property to others.360  The 
rule against perpetuities invalidates certain contingent interests that may 
vest too far into the future, and thereby prevents donors from exercising 
control over great-grandchildren and their descendants.361  The rule against 
accumulations in income “limits the time during which a settlor may direct 
the trustee to accumulate and retain income in trust.”362 
Overall, the rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation and the rule 
against perpetuities may be necessary because of imperfect information.  A 
rule disfavoring restraints on alienation also may reduce the risk of negative 
externalities in transferring property, especially if various types of complex 
restraints might entail third-party information costs.363  Finally, the rule 
against accumulations in income may prevent external effects that could 
arise from certain individuals retaining concentrated wealth.364 
Fourth, there are several restrictions on testamentary freedom that are 
based on changed circumstances, including equitable deviation, trustee 
removal, and cy pres.  Under the equitable deviation doctrine, a court may 
“modify an administrative or distributive provision of a trust, or direct or 
permit the trustee to deviate from an administrative or distributive 
provision, if because of circumstances not anticipated by the settlor the 
modification or deviation will further the purposes of the trust.”365  The 
justification for allowing modification due to unanticipated circumstances is 
based on imperfect information.  Moreover, the UTC requires that  “[t]o the 
extent practicable, the modification must be made in accordance with the 
 
Property to Whomever I Choose at My Death? (Or How I Learned To Stop Worrying and 
Start Loving the French), 44 BRANDEIS L.J. 737, 793–94 (2006) (“With literally every single 
disinheritance study showing de minimis rates of disinheritances that are not agreed to by the 
spouse, elective share laws seem like some ridiculous school child’s Rube Goldberg 
machine . . . .”). 
 360. See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 96, at 563–72. 
 361. See id. at 572–92. 
 362. Sitkoff, supra note 238, at 501; see also Karen J. Sneddon, Comment, The Sleeper 
Has Awakened:  The Rule Against Accumulations and Perpetual Trusts, 76 TUL. L. REV. 189 
(2001). 
 363. See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 96, at 566–67 (discussing policy reasons against 
restraints on alienation). 
 364. See Sitkoff, supra note 238, at 513–16 (discussing justification based on distortions 
due to accumulation of wealth). 
 365. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66(1) (2003). 
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settlor’s probable intention.”366  This requirement helps ensure that judicial 
intervention ex post will be consistent with the donor’s wishes ex ante.367 
Similarly, under the UTC, a court may remove a trustee if, among other 
things, “there has been a substantial change of circumstances . . . , the court 
finds that removal of the trustee best serves the interests of all of the 
beneficiaries and is not inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust, and 
a suitable cotrustee or successor trustee is available.”368  Once again, the 
justification for allowing trustee removal due to a change of circumstances 
is based on the fact that a settlor is operating with imperfect information.  In 
addition, while the UTC requires that removal “best serves the interests of 
all of the beneficiaries” (an ex post requirement), it also permits removal 
only if doing so is “not inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust”—a 
requirement that incorporates a settlor’s ex ante interests and incentives.369 
Likewise, the doctrine of cy pres, which applies to charitable trusts, 
provides that, “if the charitable trust’s specific purpose becomes illegal, 
impossible, or impracticable, the court may direct the application of the 
trust property to another charitable purpose that approximates the settlor’s 
general charitable intent.”370  Historically, unlike donative trusts, charitable 
trusts could last forever.  As a result, there is an even greater economic 
justification for giving courts some flexibility to modify charitable trusts 
due to a donor’s imperfect information.371  And, once again, this doctrine 
incorporates the importance of the donor’s ex ante wishes because, as its 
name suggests, cy pres requires a court to satisfy the donor’s intention “as 
nearly as possible.” 
Fifth, several recent limitations seek to restrict testamentary freedom or 
authorize courts to disregard donative intent if doing so is in the best 
interests of donees.  For example, as discussed, the Restatement (Third) of 
Trusts and UTC both allow beneficiaries to modify or terminate a trust 
without a change of circumstances.372  Likewise, the UTC allows a court to 
remove a trustee even in the absence of changed circumstances.373  There is 
a potential justification for modifying or terminating a trust due to imperfect 
information or negative externalities.  Similarly, there are circumstances in 
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which trustee removal is appropriate as the result of imperfect information.  
However, there is also a significant danger that a court may modify or 
terminate a trust, or remove a trustee, simply because doing so is in the ex 
post interests of donees.  Disregarding a donor’s intent to maximize the 
donees’ ex post interests—without one of the legitimate justifications for 
restricting testamentary freedom—may be socially undesirable. 
Sixth, and finally, two other fundamental limitations on the donor’s 
ability to transfer property at death are worth noting.  The first limitation, 
which is fairly uncontroversial, is that the donor may not transfer property 
to donees before the donor has satisfied her creditors.374  This limitation 
prevents debtors from imposing external costs on others and increasing the 
price of credit.375  The second limitation, which is more controversial, is the 
estate tax.376  The primary economic justification for an estate tax is based 
on the negative externalities that might arise by allowing particular families 
to retain concentrated wealth across generations.377  Yet, there is persistent 
disagreement about the magnitude of such externalities, as well as whether 
the potential benefits of imposing an estate tax exceed the costs of 
administering and enforcing it.378 
CONCLUSION 
The organizing principle of succession law is testamentary freedom.  
Facilitating donor intent is often consistent with maximizing social welfare, 
but the two are not coextensive.  As a result, a perennial issue is 
determining the circumstances in which the legal system should intervene 
to alter or modify a donor’s wishes on behalf of the donees, i.e., when 
should the lives of the living trump the wishes of the dead. 
There are several economic justifications for restricting the freedom of 
testation, including imperfect information, negative externalities, and 
intergenerational equity.  Given a donor’s limited ability to foresee future 
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events and the costs of specifying even foreseeable contingencies, courts 
may intercede to alter or interpret a gift due to unforeseen or unprovided-for 
events.  In addition, if a donor attempts to transfer property for a purpose 
that is illegal (e.g., a bequest for murder) or entails other external costs 
(e.g., disinheriting a spouse), the law also may have a reason to intervene.  
Finally, if the present generation is transferring property in a way that 
neglects the utility of future generations, perhaps intergenerational equity 
also serves as a sufficient justification for restricting testamentary freedom. 
However, having a court disregard a donor’s intent in order to maximize 
the donees’ ex post interests, an increasingly common reason for restricting 
testamentary freedom, is problematic.  Doing so ignores a donor’s 
happiness, a donor’s incentive to work, save, and invest, the structure and 
timing of gifts, and other ex ante considerations.  Interfering with a donor’s 
ex ante wishes to maximize the donees’ ex post interests is detrimental from 
the donor’s perspective:  the court is not facilitating the donor’s wishes.  In 
addition, because donors can alter their gifts, disregarding donative intent to 
advance the interests of particular donees may be contrary to the interests of 
donees as a class.  Thus, restricting testamentary freedom to maximize the 
ex post interests of donees is often socially undesirable. 
Many of the legal restrictions on testamentary freedom are consistent, or 
at least arguably consistent, with one or more of the economic justifications 
for restricting testamentary freedom.  However, as discussed, there are an 
increasing number of legal doctrines and law reforms, from conditional 
bequests and incentive trusts to trust modification and termination, in which 
courts and commentators have endorsed doctrines that maximize the ex post 
benefits of donees, while failing to incorporate the ex ante incentives of 
donors and the many ways in which the donor’s incentives can affect the 
donees’ interests.  Of course, whether intervention is warranted in any 
particular context depends on the specific legal doctrine at issue and the 
effects that intervention may have on the incentives of donors and donees.  
Thus, there is a need for additional analysis of succession law doctrines 
from an economic perspective as well as rigorous empirical study to obtain 
a better understanding of the effects of these doctrines on behavior.  Yet, 
overall, if the legal system views testamentary freedom from an ex post, 
rather than an ex ante, perspective, the ultimate outcome may be bad for 
donors, bad for donees, and bad for society.  In short, the living may 
themselves benefit if the law allows a certain degree of dead hand control. 
 
